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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation first elucidates some central problems with contemporary 
environmental and animal ethics, arguing that most arise from a reliance on heavily 
anthropocentric concepts such as reason, sentience, and rights. Second, it investigates 
the possibility of ontology and ethics beyond anthropocentrism, in which 
relationships between beings are based on neither identity nor difference alone, but 
rather on ‘indistinction’. There is a particular focus on how mainstream western 
philosophy and science suffer from a failure to recognize and overcome two 
particularly insidious founding dichotomies of western thought and culture: those 
that oppose humans to (other-than-human) animals, and animals to the environment.   
 The argument that the primacy of ethics must be acknowledged is central, as is 
the notion that bodily comportment must be engaged in ethical behaviour. Drawing 
parallels between Merleau-Ponty and other thinkers, especially feminists, the 
dissertation also interrogates the role science plays in philosophy, especially in 
respect of its contributions to shaping and promulgating Cartesian notions of the self, 
and to widespread treatment of both other-than-human animals and other ‘natural’ 
entities as ‘other’ to and separable from human beings, as objects rather than 
subjects.   
 A central argument is that Merleau-Ponty’s later ontology offers the most 
promising prospect in establishing a non-anthropocentric ethics. Drawing on other 
thinkers’ ideas to ‘flesh out’ Merleau-Ponty’s unfinished work, the issue of how ethical 
behaviour might be motivated in a less anthropocentric culture is discussed, as is the 
issue of western philosophy’s epistemophilia. The conclusion is that environmental 
ethics must embrace an ontology of the flesh in which human/animal and 
animal/environment dichotomies are overcome, the embodied and intersubjective 
nature of being is acknowledged, and ‘environment’ is recognized as something that 
we all live rather than live in. 
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 1 
Introduction: 
THE HUMAN/ANIMAL AND ANIMAL/ENVIRONMENT DIVIDE 
 
 
Conservation is a state of harmony between men and land. (Aldo Leopold, 
1953)1 
 
There is simply no reason to maintain that any differences that may exist 
between human minds and animal minds mean that animals have no 
interest in continuing to exist or that the sentient experiences of 
nonhuman animals have a lesser weight than do those of humans … The 
only thing that is required is that nonhumans be sentient; that is, that they 
be perceptually aware. Sentience is necessary to have interests at all. (Gary 
Francione, 2010)2 
 
 
The first quotation above, from Leopold’s Round River, highlights presumptions 
of not just the two dichotomies of this Introduction’s title, but also a third. 
First, it reveals by exclusion the presumption of the human/animal dichotomy, 
as it is concerned only with harmony between human beings and the 
environment: OTHAs (OTHA stands for other-than-human-animal) are notable 
only by their absence from this definition of conservation. Second, the 
animal/environment dichotomy is evident in the presumption that ‘the land’ 
and animal life are separable ‘things’, between which some kind of harmony is 
desirable – because, the implication is, both our (separate-but-interrelated) 
futures depend on it. Third, the word ‘men’ is, arguably, far from insignificant: 
it not only evokes the male/female dichotomy, but goes further by 
underscoring an apparent association between ‘man’ and ‘human’ and, 
relatedly, ‘woman’ and ‘nature’ or ‘the land’.  
 The second, longer quotation from a recent article by Francione, most 
obviously asserts an animal/environment distinction, as it identifies sentience 
as the crucial element in moral considerability – clearly stating that in order to 
have interests (and so, rights), sentience is required. Less overtly, the 
                                                 
1
 Aldo Leopold in Luna B. Leopold, ed., Round river: From the journals of Aldo Leopold (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), 145. 
2
 Gary L. Francione, ‘Animal welfare and the moral value of nonhuman animals’, Law, Culture and the 
Humanities, 6, 1 (2010), 24–36 (p.31). 
 2 
quotation asserts a human/animal dichotomy. In essence, Francione – like Tom 
Regan and other animal rights philosophers – is arguing that OTHAs have 
rights on the basis of a fundamental similarity to humans, that is, their 
sentience. While Francione’s particular version of animal rights philosophy 
differs significantly from Regan’s, they do, essentially, share the same identity 
politics:  
 
the really crucial, the basic similarity is simply this: we are each of us the 
experiencing subject of a life, a conscious creature having an individual 
welfare that has importance to us whatever our usefulness to others.3 
 
The ethically pertinent result of this is, for all animal rightists, precisely that 
OTHAs have ‘rights’. 
 The hegemonic human/animal and animal/environment dichotomies 
are deeply anthropocentric. Along with that of man/woman and related 
dichotomies, in a culture that tends to think both atomistically and 
oppositionally, they underpin and sustain a western worldview reflected in its 
predominantly anthropocentric philosophy. 
 
*** 
My first aim in this dissertation is to elucidate some of the most pressing 
difficulties with contemporary environmental and animal ethics, arguing that 
most arise from their continued if varied focus on heavily anthropocentric 
concepts such as reason, sentience, and rights as foundational. I focus in 
particular on ways in which environmental philosophers and animal ethicists – 
with their seemingly quite different approaches to giving moral status and 
weight to non-human others (whether animal or ‘inanimate’)4 – both suffer 
from a failure to fully recognize and overcome two particularly insidious 
                                                 
3
 Tom Regan, The case for animal rights: Updated with a new preface (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2004), Preface, p.xx. 
4
 Throughout this dissertation, I use the acronym ‘OTHA’ to refer to other-than-human animals, and the 
phrases ‘non-human others’ and ‘other-than-humans’ when I refer to both OTHAs and inanimate entities of 
environment. 
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founding dichotomies of western thought and culture: those that oppose 
humans to (other-than-human) animals, and animals to the environment.5  
 In this context, my second key aim is to investigate the possibility of 
ethics beyond these divides, in which ethical relationships are based on neither 
identity nor difference, nor on anthropocentric concepts such as rights and 
reason. To do this, I draw on arguments that an effective ethics can be based on 
‘neither sameness nor otherness alone’, and that the primacy of ethics must be 
acknowledged.6  
 Considering recent opposition to anthropocentrism, I suggest that 
ultimately, a truly environmental ethics must embrace a different ontology 
from that which underpins contemporary animal ethics and environmental 
philosophies – an ontology in which human/animal and animal/environment 
dichotomies hold no sway, because human-OTHA kinship is embraced, and 
environment is understood as something that we live rather than live in; as 
part of us and us of it – that it ‘is not something that begins where our skins 
end’.7 
 In proposing this, I draw on the work of philosophers including Kelly 
Oliver, Luce Irigaray, and Matthew Calarco, arguing that Merleau-Ponty’s 
ontology of the flesh provides the most promising way forward in terms of 
both understanding and establishing a non-anthropocentric ethics. 
Considering how he undermines utterly the Cartesian subject by insisting that 
                                                 
5
 Somewhat paradoxically, the term ‘animals’ in the latter dichotomy includes humans (sometimes 
exclusively) – and perhaps/sometimes excludes smaller animals (e.g. insects) who are somehow identified 
more with ‘environment’ than ‘animality’. This points to precisely the confusion, contradictions and over-
simplifications that surround these terms when used as exclusionary. 
6
 The quotation’s from Kelly Oliver, Animal lessons: How they teach us to be human (Columbia UP, 2009), 
304. My mention of the primacy of ethics here refers primarily to the position proposed by Jim Cheney and 
Anthony Weston in ‘Environmental ethics as environmental etiquette: Toward an ethics-based 
epistemology’, Environmental Ethics, 21 (1999), 115–34, but also alludes to Levinas and others (see below).  
7
 Don E. Marietta, Jr., ‘Back to earth with reflection and ecology’, in Eco-phenomenology: Back to the Earth 
itself, ed. by Brown and Toadvine (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2003), pp. 121–35 (p.124). For this reason, too – 
influenced by Merleau-Ponty’s concept of ‘flesh’, discussed below – I refer not to ‘the environment’ but to 
‘environment’ (except when referencing specific philosophies and ideas about, specifically, ‘the 
environment’). This is to foreground the idea that we are of environment, rather than living in ‘the’ 
environment. I’m aware this deletion of ‘the’ sometimes sounds/reads awkwardly – but to some extent, 
that is the point (to ‘make strange’ the term ‘environment’). 
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‘all consciousness is thoroughly corporeal’8 and that ‘relationships among 
beings are possible not just for man but also for animals’,9 I focus on how 
Merleau-Ponty’s ontology helps respond to Marti Kheel’s call to fellow 
ecofeminists to develop alternative understandings of nature philosophy ‘that 
incorporate … care and respect for individual beings as well as larger 
ecological processes’.10 It is Kheel’s call to which this dissertation responds.  
 Accordingly, I devote more time to discussing OTHAs than ‘the 
environment’. Given my – and, more importantly, Merleau-Ponty’s – position 
that animals and environment are ‘intertwined’, this does not mean I’m less 
interested, ethically, in environment than in OTHAs. It reflects, though, that 
while there’s already a substantial body of work around Merleau-Ponty and 
environmental philosophy, he is comparatively ‘rarely mentioned by most 
participants in the recent spate of critical animal studies’.11  
 Foregrounding my focus on individual OTHAs, I start by in Chapter 1 
analysing how some of them have been presented in philosophical writing 
about environment and ethics. The examples illustrate how ecocentric 
environmental philosophies that consider ‘the environment’, ‘the biotic 
community’ and ‘the ecological whole’ are not only problematic in failing to 
overcome human/animal and animal/environment dichotomies, but are mired 
especially deeply in an anthropocentric Cartesian notion of personhood – one 
which asserts an isolated and disembodied self – despite claims that humans 
are just another species amongst many, in an ecosystem more important than 
its individual parts. I also illustrate how mainstream animal ethics – whether 
from an animal rights or welfarist perspective – shares this basic attachment to 
human/animal and animal/environment dichotomies, and to accordingly 
anthropocentric notions of reason and the self that underpin the concept of 
‘rights’.  
                                                 
8
 Monika Langer, ‘Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty: Some of their contributions and limitations for 
“environmentalism”’, in Eco-phenomenology, ed. by Brown and Toadvine, pp. 103–20 (p.116). 
9
 Oliver, Animal lessons, p.217. 
10
 Marti Kheel, Nature ethics: An ecofeminist perspective (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), p.207. 
11
 Louise Westling, ‘Merleau-Ponty’s human-animality intertwining and the animal question’, 
Configurations, 18 (2010), 161–80 (p.163). 
 5 
 In Chapter 2, I interrogate the role science plays in philosophies of 
environment and animal ethics, especially in respect of the contributions of 
mainstream western science to shaping and promulgating Cartesian notions of 
the self, and anthropocentric bias in how both OTHAs and environment are 
treated as radically ‘other’ to and separable from human beings. I investigate 
issues around anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism in and beyond 
‘science’, outline some of Merleau-Ponty’s ideas concerning both selfhood and 
science, and – throughout – consider the parallels between Merleau-Ponty and 
(eco)feminist arguments.  
 Chapter 3 focuses primarily on elucidating elements of Merleau-Ponty’s 
thought that challenge anthropocentrism, on starting to address the tricky 
issue of how ethical behaviour might be motivated, and on the overarching 
‘problem’ of western philosophy’s epistemophilia and its contribution to the 
anthropocentrism of the west. 
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Chapter 1: 
INDIFFERENCE/IDENTITY/DIFFERENCE:  
LOCATING OTHAs AND ENVIRONMENT IN WESTERN  
PHILOSOPHY…  AND BEYOND 
 
The Renaissance and the Reformation did not simply actualize some 
preexisting or easily anticipated notion of persons, but rather played a 
part in the larger co-evolution of respect for persons. What would emerge 
could only be imagined in advance in the dimmest of ways, or not 
imagined at all. Similarly, we are only now embarking on an attempt to 
move beyond anthropocentrism, and we simply cannot predict in advance 
where even another century of moral change will take us. (Anthony 
Weston, 1992)12 
 
 
I. Environmental Philosophy and Dead Animals 
In 1948,13 Aldo Leopold ruminated on how he’d felt some years previously as 
he watched a wolf he and his fellow hunters had shot die in front of them – 
seeing ‘a fierce green fire dying in her eyes’.14 More recently, in 1995, Holmes 
Rolston III described coming across the body of an elk killed by wolves, whilst 
he was out hunting. Reflecting on this experience, he writes that  
 
I was witness to an ecology of predator and prey, to population dynamics, 
to heterotrophs feeding on autotrophs. The carcass, beginning to decay, 
was already being recycled by microorganisms.15 
 
 As Kheel has argued at some length,16 Leopold identifies not with the 
individual wolf who was dying (nor with her pups, who were with her), but 
                                                 
12
 Anthony Weston, ‘Before environmental ethics’, Environmental Ethics, 14 (1992), 321–38 (p.331). 
13
 Aldo Leopold, A Sand County almanac, and sketches here and there (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1987 [1948]); as Kheel notes (Nature ethics, p.113), Leopold continued hunting for some 30 years after the 
experience he describes with the wolf; this points to the extent to which he was not moved to change his 
behaviour, and how it was perhaps only retrospectively that he even saw this experience as significant. 
14
 Leopold, A Sand County almanac, 1948/1987, p.130. 
15
 Holmes Rolston III, ‘Does aesthetic appreciation of landscapes need to be science-based?’, British Journal 
of Aesthetics, 35, 4 (1995), 374–86 (p.384). 
16
 Kheel, Nature ethics, 112–15; more generally, Ch. 4, ‘Thinking like a mountain, or thinking like a “man”?’.  
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rather with the mountain that overlooked the scene. Similarly, Rolston 
identifies with the ‘ecology of predator and prey’ and not with the elk who’d 
suffered and died. Since both Rolston and Leopold were out hunting, it’s 
perhaps something of a forgone conclusion that the two men would, despite 
the different historical and philosophical contexts of their experiences, identify 
less with an individual dead or dying animal, and more with the ecological 
context in which they styled themselves participants. Arguably, humans who 
hunt have decided a priori that individual OTHAs’ lives are far less important 
than their own – an assumption of vast philosophical and ethical significance. 
This tendency for so-called ecocentric environmental philosophers to identify 
with ecological systems or the environment at large, rather than with 
individual OTHAs who like us move about in and as part of the environment, is 
one of the central philosophical positions that this dissertation critiques and 
hopes to move beyond.  
 The other area of pertinence and concern might be termed ‘animal 
ethics’ – the field concerning animal rights and/or welfare. The field is 
frequently presented as being in opposition to ecocentric ‘holist’ 
environmental philosophies, largely because in its various forms, its emphasis 
is on the ethical status of individual OTHAs rather than on that of ‘the 
environment’ as a whole. While arguments have diversified in recent years, the 
basic contrast is laid bare in key texts such as J. Baird Callicott’s influential 
1980 article, ‘Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair’, wherein he argues 
vehemently that ‘inanimate entities such as oceans and lakes, mountains, 
forests, and wetlands are assigned a greater value than individual animals’ by 
the (ecocentric) environmental ethic he favours,17 and that the concerns of 
‘animal liberation’ ethics are too close to those of traditional anthropocentric 
ethics to constitute environmental ethics at all. In essence, while I disagree that 
inanimate entities have a ‘greater value’ than OTHAs, I agree that the lack of 
distinctiveness from anthropocentric ethics displayed by most animal ethics is 
                                                 
17
 J. Baird Callicott, ‘Animal liberation: A triangular affair’, Environmental Ethics, 2 (1980), reprinted in J. 
Baird Callicott, In defense of the land ethic: Essays in environmental philosophy (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1989), 58. 
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deeply problematic. However, since this dissertation argues that not only 
animal ethics but also most forms of ecocentric environmental philosophy 
share an anthropocentric bias, this criticism is not one I agree can be targeted 
only at animal ethics. 
 The chasm between environmental ethics and animal ethics grew in the 
1980s, but, as Dale Jamieson illustrates,18 by the end of that decade, bridges 
had been built; indeed, ‘Callicott … expressed regret for the rhetoric of his 1980 
essay’.19 Accordingly, many adopted Jamieson’s view that ‘any plausible ethic 
must address concerns about both animals and the environment’20 – a view I 
share.  
 Despite this, in mainstream western philosophy there remains quite a 
gap between philosophers concerned more with ‘the environment’ and those 
more concerned with OTHAs. There still remains some tension – perhaps 
especially, as Ned Hettinger and Jennifer Everett have elucidated,21 vis-à-vis 
attitudes towards hunting and predation.22  
 It’s in this context that I opened with reminders of ecocentric 
philosophers’ clear privileging of inanimate entities and the ecosystem, and 
concomitant lack of regard for individual OTHAs – despite the fact that human 
animals, OTHAs and less animate23 entities combine in and share a life-world 
                                                 
18
 See Dale Jamieson, ‘Animal liberation is an environmental ethic’, Environmental Values, 1997, online pre-
publication pdf, last accessed 31 December 2012 
19
 Jamieson, ‘Animal liberation is an environmental ethic’, 5; see J. Baird Callicott, ‘Animal liberation and 
environmental ethics: Back together again’, Between the Species, 4, 3 (1988), 163–9. 
20
 Jamieson, ‘Animal liberation is an environmental ethic’, 5. 
21
 See Ned Hettinger, ‘Bambi lovers versus tree huggers’, in Food for thought: The debate over eating meat, 
ed. by Steve F. Sapontzis (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2004), 294–301; Jennifer Everett, ‘Environmental 
ethics, animal welfarism, and the problem of predation: A Bambi lover’s respect for nature’, Ethics and the 
Environment, 6, 1 (Spring 2001), 42–67. Note, too, that arguments privileging ‘the environment’ over OTHAs 
are prevalent in the realm where philosophy and the biological sciences meet: see e.g. Stephen Vantassel, 
‘Animal suffering should not trump environmental stewardship’, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 53, 3 
(2010), 458–70. 
22
 As Everett notes (but argues against), ‘Because of its emphasis on the prevention of animal suffering, 
some environmental philosophers criticize animal welfarism as, at best, falling short of the appreciation of 
predation that any adequate environmental ethic must exhibit’: Everett, ‘Environmental ethics, animal 
welfarism, and the problem of predation’, 43. 
23
 I find the term ‘inanimate entities’ quite peculiar – since not just plants, trees, flowers and bodies of 
water are quite obviously animate(d), but so too is ‘the land’ (if often over distinctly longer, geological 
periods of time!). This is not a point I have the space to elaborate on, but it’s the reason I coin the term ‘less 
animate entities’ when speaking in my own voice, rather than citing/referencing those who use ‘inanimate’. 
To call them inanimate seems inaccurate, distancing them from the elemental ‘flesh’ that I discuss below. 
 9 
(as Merleau-Ponty emphasizes). This reveals the extent to which ecocentric 
and animal ethicists alike remain caught up in not just the human/animal 
dichotomy about which so much has been written in recent years, but also in 
the animal/environment dichotomy which, I argue, is part of the same 
underlying anthropocentric bias in western philosophy – a bias that not just 
assumes and perpetuates but also encourages division amongst and between 
ethicists, and which must therefore be subject to interrogation and critique for 
progress to be made toward a worldview beyond such dichotomies, and ethics 
to accompany it. 
 
 
II. The Mountain and the Wolf 
Leopold’s concern in writing about the individual wolf’s slow and painful death 
from multiple bullets, is not to express that the death was wrong – or that he 
was saddened by it – but to tell us he was wrong in thinking that ‘because 
fewer wolves meant more deer, that no wolves would mean a hunters’ 
paradise’. His concern is that he was wrong because killing wolves gives deer 
free rein to over-graze – and, as he writes: 
 
I have watched the face of many a newly wolfless mountain, and seen the 
south-facing slopes wrinkle with a maze of new deer trails. I have seen 
every edible bush and seedling browsed, first to anaemic desuetude, and 
then to death. I have seen every edible tree defoliated to the height of a 
saddlehorn.24 
 
 Marcia Muelder Eaton shares Leopold’s concern about the destructive 
force of deer. In a 1998 article asserting the value of scientific knowledge 
versus imagination and fiction in appreciating nature, she typified the attitudes 
of many environment-focused philosophers by arguing that 
anthropomorphism (especially ‘bambi-ization’)25 is highly problematic for 
                                                 
24
 Leopold, A Sand County almanac, p.132 
25
 Eaton doesn’t use the term ‘bambi-ization’, nor does she refer to the ‘Disneyfication’ of nature. However, 
her choice of Bambi to compare to real deer suggests she’s well aware of such characterizations of 
anthropomorphism, and is evoking them and their specific version of what ‘anthropomorphism’ entails.  
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ecology because such ‘imaginative fancies’ are ‘often directed by fictional 
creations’ and – where her specific example is Bambi26 – make it  
 
incredibly difficult to look at a deer in terms that are true to it as an object 
on its own and even more difficult to respond to it in terms appropriate to 
the ecological role that it increasingly plays in the ecological systems it has 
come to dominate.27  
 
In particular, Eaton’s concerned with the ‘ecologically’ problematic role deer 
play in relation to (human) planning issues and concepts of deer as ‘vermin’.28 
Eaton’s answer to this ‘problem’ is similar to that proposed by many 
environmental philosophers: she looks to scientific knowledge as the basis for 
‘sustainable’ ecological practices.29  
 Significantly, there is considerable overlap between Leopold’s 1948 and 
Rolston’s and Eaton’s more recent attitudes to OTHAs. Leopold’s story serves 
to argue for the importance of predators to the ‘natural’ balance of an 
environment that, stripped of too many predators, is left to the mercy of 
grazing species. For Leopold as for Eaton, the individual OTHA is regarded as 
merely one member of a species – not as an individual living being who has 
relationships with others, let alone ‘rights’. Neither philosopher is concerned 
with individual deer, but only with what they characterize all deer (plural) as 
doing: i.e., defoliating the environment.30 This attitude reveals much about 
ecocentric philosophies’ tendency to prioritize abstract wholes like species and 
ecological wholes including ‘the environment’ over individual OTHAs and less 
animate entities. Leopold’s is the kind of thinking that founds this approach – 
and that of his fellow hunters, as illustrated at Figure 1. 
                                                 
26
 She refers in her article to both the book and the film version of the story: Felix Salten, Bambi, trans. 
Whittaker Chambers (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1928); the film of the same name was famously 
produced by the USA’s Walt Disney Productions in 1942 (supervising director, David D. Hand).  
27
 Marcia Muelder Eaton, ‘Fact and fiction in the aesthetic appreciation of nature’, in The aesthetics of 
natural environments, ed. by Allen Carlson and Arnold Berleant (Mississauga, Canada: Broadview Press, 
2004), pp. 170–81 (p.175, my emphasis). 
28
 Eaton, ‘Fact and fiction’, p.175. 
29
 ibid., pp.177–9. 
30
 While Leopold shows some awareness of the responsibility of humans in this ecological situation coming 
about, this is something Eaton inexplicably and sorely lacks. 
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 It’s in this context that Kheel argues convincingly that ‘[t]oday’s 
collective moral orientation toward nature and other-than-humans’ is the 
‘legacy’ of the views of nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century sport 
hunters31 including Theodore D. Roosevelt and Leopold. In particular, she 
identifies and explains how the origins of the conservation movement (in the 
west) lie with ideas including that hunting was essential to conserve natural 
‘resources’ including the ‘aesthetic’ value of nature, and on the worldview that 
‘nature’ should be advocated for as a ‘biotic community’, rather than as a 
community of individuals.32 Reassessing views about Leopold as the ‘father’ of 
modern-day conservation, Kheel shows that on Leopold’s view, ‘a major motive 
for the preservation of … reserves was to create well-stocked hunting-
grounds’, and – crucially – that even after his views evolved to consider the 
value of predators to conservation, he and the conservationist philosophy he 
espouses still take the perspective of ‘the mountain, not that of the wolf’.33  
 Kheel’s analyses of Roosevelt and Leopold, alongside more recent 
ecocentric holists, Rolston and Warwick Fox,34 illustrate and support her 
position that many of the attitudes and approaches of western moral 
philosophy to OTHAs and environment are heavily informed by a hunting 
‘ethos’ that rests on a sharp distinction between ‘man’ (sic) and ‘nature’, and 
the (ethical) privilege of the ‘whole’ over individuals. Critiquing Rolston’s 
privileging of humans as the only animals capable of a transcendent (point-of-
)view, and his position that ‘reverence, empathy, and feelings of compassion 
spring from a scientific understanding of ecology and metaphysics’, Kheel asks: 
                                                 
31
 Kheel, Nature ethics, p.96. 
32
 ibid., 71, 80, 82; see also Ronnie Zoe Hawkins, ‘Ecofeminism and nonhumans: Continuity, difference, 
dualism, and domination’, Hypatia, 13, 1 (1998), 158–97, esp. p.170, where she develops her argument that 
‘the dualistically distorted view of the individual/member-of-a-group relation, a view that recognizes 
humans only as individuals and nonhumans only as members of populations or species, serves as a major 
impediment to conceiving of ecological relationships in such a way that we can begin to solve some of our 
most critical environmental problems’. 
33
 Kheel, Nature ethics, pp.112, 115. 
34
 Fox in particular represents the views of many ‘deep ecologists’, who are as a group decidedly holistic in 
their approach to ‘the environment’: see e.g. Warwick Fox, A theory of general ethics: Human relationships, 
nature, and the built environment (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2006). I don’t focus on deep ecology in 
this dissertation, because: (i) I lack the space to engage with it properly as a specific variant of ‘holism’, and 
(ii) I considered it quite extensively in an essay for this degree, so cannot anyway replicate that material 
here. (The same is true of ecofeminism, which I considered in some detail in the same essay). 
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‘But does this scientifically inspired, God-like view include care for individual 
other-than-human animals?’35  
 
 
Figure 1: Cartoon by SAWN, displaying a summary and remarkably pithy 
critique of arguments put forward by Leopold and others.36 
 
 
  Attitudes such as Rolston’s – valuing the ‘whole’ over individuals, and 
asserting the ‘value’ in OTHAs and ‘the environment’ stems from humans – are 
prevalent in contemporary environmental ethics, including the aesthetics of 
‘nature’ and even some versions of ‘animal ethics’ (especially those that 
privilege species). In both aesthetics and environmental ethics, the dominant 
view regards ‘science’ as the guiding discourse enabling human beings to most 
fully appreciate and understand non-human others. Certainly Allen Carlson’s 
                                                 
35
 Kheel, Nature ethics, p.147. 
36
 It’s hard to access information about the texts read (or not read) by the cartoonist, but it remains 
interesting that the predators here slain are wolves (as per Leopold), that it is elk (per Rolston) who are 
under threat, and that the whole scene is overlooked by mountains in the distance. (There is, however, no 
indication of deer aggressively defoliating the environment.) 
 13 
model of aesthetic appreciation rests explicitly on scientific knowledge as a 
necessary condition,37 and philosophers including Rolston and Eaton espouse a 
similar view. 
 Rolston’s philosophical work straddles environmental ethics and 
philosophical aesthetics, especially aesthetics of ‘nature’. He, along with 
thinkers including Emily Brady, Yuriko Saito, and Arnold Berleant in varying 
ways and to differing extents, foreground the interrelated nature of aesthetics 
and ethics, showing how our conceptions and understandings of ‘nature’ as 
‘other’ underlie different programs of aesthetic appreciation.38 
 
*** 
Ecocentric holist philosophers, then, tend to focus on non-individual elements 
of ‘the environment’. The focus on the biotic community, or the wider 
ecosystem, so prevalent in environmental ethics is mirrored in other areas of 
philosophy concerned with ‘nature’: the tendency is very much to focus on so-
called inanimate entities. So even if some ‘animals’ are considered, it’s usually 
only those too small or too un-human-like to be the subjects of animal ethics,39 
with a focus on them exclusively as components of the wider ecosystem. This 
privileging of less animate, abstracted aspects of nature and/as ‘the 
environment’, and also of human beings, concerns philosophers interested in 
asserting the ethical status and significance of OTHAs. Ultimately, ecocentric 
holists exclude only OTHAs from ethics – from the biotic community. At very 
best, they consider OTHAs last, and as species not individuals. Hence, OTHAs 
                                                 
37
 Brady, Aesthetics of the natural environment (Tuscaloosa: U of Alabama Press, 2003), p.91; see Allen 
Carlson, Aesthetics and the natural environment: The appreciation of nature, art, and architecture (London 
& New York: Routledge, 2000). 
38
 Brady argues that ‘preserving the autonomy of the aesthetic does not lead to the conclusion that the 
edges between aesthetic and other environmental values are clear and sharp’, hence the pertinence of 
ethics: Brady, Aesthetics of the natural environment, pp.87, 115. She concludes, though, that while ‘[o]ur 
ability to exercise aesthetic sensitivity and our ability to make right choices both draw on our capacities of 
perceptual sensitivity, imagination and feeling…’ (p.258), ‘[a] developed aesthetic sensibility is not in itself 
sufficient to support an environmental ethic’ (p.259). 
39
 On the significance of size to environmental ethics, see Charles S. Cockell, ‘Environmental ethics and size’, 
Ethics & the Environment, 13, 1 (Spring 2008), 23–39. 
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are always deemed secondary to both ‘the ecosystem’ and to humans; always 
treated as instrumental for others.40  
 Environmental philosophy’s complete neglect of domesticated OTHAs 
(whether ‘pets’ or farm animals) further evidences this. As Kheel argues, 
ecocentric holists typically consider domestic OTHAs as ‘irrelevant or 
detrimental to the ecological arena and hence of no direct moral concern’.41 
Rolston’s views are typically extreme: he argues that because ‘they are bred to 
be eaten’, domestic OTHAs ‘are only partly natural’.42 The degree to which this 
elides not just OTHA individuality, but human responsibility for the situation of 
especially farm animals is quite shocking – echoing Leopold and Eaton’s 
glossing over of why it is that deer have come to be an environmental ‘hazard’. 
As Ronnie Zoe Hawkins argues, holist philosophers of this type,  
 
who refuse to relinquish their own essentialism and human/nature or 
mind/nature dualism, as expressed through such attitudes, have a 
considerable distance to travel before they can claim an adequate grasp 
of the nonhuman life that, together with human life, makes up the ‘whole’ 
of nature.43 
 
  
III. Animal Ethics and Identity Politics 
In contrast – and, often, in response – to environmental philosophy’s tendency 
to consider the biotic community and human beings as ethically and 
aesthetically significant, but to downplay the status of OTHAs (or to exclude 
them entirely), the two main strands of animal ethics44 – rights and welfarism – 
rely heavily on establishing ‘a relevantly similar moral identity between human 
                                                 
40
 Bob Jickling and Paul C. Paquet’s article, ‘Wolf stories: Reflections on science, ethics, and epistemology’ 
(Environmental Ethics, 27 [Summer 2005], 115–34) provides an excellent discussion of this issue, as well as 
an enlightening case study of wolf ‘management’ in the Yukon.  
41
 Kheel, Nature ethics, p.19. 
42
 Holmes Rolston III, Environmental ethics: Duties to and values in the natural world (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1988), p.80. 
43
 Hawkins, ‘Ecofeminism and nonhumans’, p.170. 
44
 Arguably, feminist care ethics by now constitute a fairly major third strand of animal ethics. However, the 
approach is not yet as established as the two I discuss here, and I do discuss it below. 
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beings and animals’.45 This approach is problematic, as its often 
unacknowledged anthropocentrism reinscribes the human/animal dichotomy 
it purports to reject,46 especially in its reliance upon an atomistic, all-too-
(defined-as-)human rational subject. As Calarco argues, the kind of 
‘anthropocentric extensionism’ inherent in these approaches grants ‘ethical 
priority to animals that resemble human beings in morally relevant ways, 
while denigrating or giving subordinate status to those animals who do not’.47  
 Oliver highlights that the type of line-drawing therefore involved in 
animal ethics – whether Francione’s and Regan’s animal rights, or Peter 
Singer’s welfarist approach –  
 
creates two sides: the have and the have-nots, those who have what it 
takes to be inherently valuable [sentience] and those who do not. 
Conceptually, this is the same kind of oppositional and exclusionary 
thinking inherent in the man–animal or human–animal dichotomy. 
 
This leads her to ask, ‘How can we apply the rights of persons to animals if the 
very distinction between animals and persons is inherent in the notion of 
rights?’48 – and,  
 
Just as feminists have asked why women have to be like men in order to be 
equal, we can ask, Why do animals have to be like us to have inherent 
value? The notion that man is the measure of all things is precisely the 
kind of thinking that justifies exploiting animals, along with women and 
the earth, for his purposes.49 
 
 
 Oliver’s analysis is based on the realization that while animal ethicists 
attempt to found a positive ethics by establishing morally pertinent similarities 
between humans and other animals, identity politics cannot provide a non-
anthropocentric ethic because its logic is inherently anthropocentric. On its 
                                                 
45
 Matthew Calarco, ‘Identity, difference, indistinction’, The New Centennial Review, 11, 2 (Fall 2012), 41–60 
(p.42) 
46
 Indeed, Calarco (ibid., 47) notes that ‘whereas animal ethicists may in fact be contesting a certain kind of 
speciesism, the fundamental logic and structure of the problem they are battling is operating in an 
altogether different, anthropocentric register that they not only fail to notice but actually reinforce and 
expand’. 
47
 ibid., pp.45–6. 
48
 Oliver, ‘What is wrong with (animal) rights?’, p.216. 
49
 ibid., p.217. 
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logic, man (sic) is the measure of all things, with moral value measured in 
relation to how ‘like’ humans individual OTHAs and species are. This is 
compounded by androcentrism: western philosophy’s exclusionary, 
patriarchal nature has characterized humans as defined by autonomy and 
rationality – where numerous philosophers have shown these characteristics 
to be defined as human not just in opposition to ‘the animal’ and less animate 
nature, but to women and other humans who have, in various historical and 
geographical locations, been defined as ‘other’.50 This is why – importantly, 
since I’m concerned with ethics – I concur with Oliver that because the 
human/animal dichotomy is the opposition ‘used most often to justify violence, 
not only man’s violence to animals, but also man’s violence to other people 
deemed to be like animals’, behaviours including sexism and racism as well as 
slavery and torture are ‘historically inseparable from the question of the 
animal’.51 As ecofeminists including Carol Adams and Val Plumwood have long 
argued,52 the human/animal dichotomy plays an ongoing and central role in 
oppositions styled similarly as between ‘civilized’, ‘rational’ man and ‘barbaric’, 
non-rational ‘nature’. In challenging the human/animal dichotomy, then, lies 
hope for not just ‘animal’ ethics or even ‘environmental’ ethics as those terms 
are usually coined, but an ethos that overcomes both anthropocentrism and 
androcentrism. 
 Critiquing the ongoing valorization of reason in animal ethics that 
persists despite feminist work that has problematized the concept so 
thoroughly,53 Cathryn Bailey argues that both Singer and Regan fail to 
                                                 
50
 See e.g., Genevieve Lloyd, The man of reason: ‘male' and ‘female' in western philosophy (London: 
Methuen, 1984); Michèle Le Doeuff, Hipparchia’s choice: An essay concerning women, philosophy, etc., 
trans. Trista Selous (Oxford, UK & Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1991); The sex of knowing, trans. Kathyrn 
Hamer and Lorraine Code (New York: Routledge, 2003). 
51
 Oliver, Animal lessons, 303. 
52
 See Carol Adams, The sexual politics of meat (New York: Continuum, 1990); Val Plumwood, Feminism and 
the mastery of nature (London & New York: Routledge, 1993); ‘Nature, self, and gender: Feminism, 
environmental philosophy, and the critique of rationalism’, in Environmental ethics, ed. by Robert Elliott, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 155–64; Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of 
Reason (London & New York: Routledge, 2002). 
53
 See e.g. sources cited at footnote 50, herein above. 
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recognize the thrust of ecofeminist criticism54 – mistakenly ‘understanding the 
problem to be one of an absence of emotion rather than a recognition of the 
continuity between reason and emotion’.55 Bailey’s analysis elucidates a 
particular blind spot shared by Singer, Regan, Francione, and other animal 
ethicists: they fail to take into account the feminist argument that  
 
Reason did not first come into existence and then look for a venue to 
exhibit itself, rather, what much of philosophy came to define as reason 
only came into being as result of denying and quashing those attributes 
regarded as feminine or bodily.56 
 
Instead, animal ethicists continue to use notions of reason, humanity and 
selfhood defined and delimited by a Cartesian privileging of disembodied 
reason. This results in ethics that promote ‘rights’ for OTHAs, but fail utterly to 
address the issues inherent in the (hu)man/animal binary and its privileging of 
reason and sentience as definitive of the (always-impliedly-human) ‘subject’ 
that creates the context in which OTHAs – the ‘objects’ in this particular binary 
– are deprived of not just rights, but any genuine ethical consideration. 
 Fundamentally, then, I believe animal ethics – ‘even’ Francione’s radical 
version – has reached an impasse. So long as it fails to learn feminism’s lesson 
that an oppressed group or individual’s position cannot be effectively 
advanced on the basis of their being acknowledged as ‘the same’ as those who 
oppress them, it seems doomed to be forever caught up with the questions of 
line-drawing outlined above – failing to realize the philosophical weight of the 
exclusionary basis of claims based on identity; using strategies that ‘inevitably 
end up justifying rights or equality for some and not others, many times for an 
elite few’.57 
                                                 
54
 In particular, Bailey references Regan and Singer’s responses to Josephine Donovan’s, ‘Animal rights and 
feminist theory’ [1990], in Beyond animal rights: A feminist caring ethic for the treatment of animals, ed. by 
Josephine Donovan and Carol J. Adams (New York: Continuum, 1996), pp.34–59 (see esp. p.35): Cathryn 
Bailey, ‘On the backs of animals: The valorization of reason in contemporary animal ethics’, Ethics and the 
Environment 10, 1 (Spring 2005), 1–17. 
55
 ibid., p.2. 
56
 ibid., p.4. 
57
 Oliver, ‘What is wrong with (animal) rights?’, p.219. 
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 It’s unfair to suggest that philosophers who’ve battled against the 
traditional human/animal boundary have achieved nothing.58 Legal rights for 
OTHAs fail to address the causes of oppression and denigration,59 but have 
done much to help individual OTHAs and draw attention to the more complex 
causes of their situation – as have arguments around how far OTHAs are ‘like’ 
humans, and sentient.60 However, the insistence of these philosophers that 
ethical transformation lies in ‘a certain rational, reflective understanding of 
ethics’,61 motivated primarily by reason rather than by emotion or genuine 
kinship with OTHAs, remains.62 ‘This approach moves the ethical encounter 
with animals themselves out of the realm of bodily or affective relation and 
into the space of neutral rationality’63 – which radically restricts the 
development of ethics beyond a privileging of reason and beyond 
anthropocentric dichotomies. Critiquing this separation-out of ‘bodily’ and 
‘rational’ realms in western thought is central to this dissertation, as is 
presenting alternatives.  
  
IV. Philosophies of Difference 
Just as feminists who, recognizing the limitations of basing arguments on 
claiming identity/equality with men, moved to embrace difference,64 some 
philosophers look to difference to benefit OTHAs. Unsurprisingly, such 
                                                 
58
 Calarco explicates this in ‘Identity, difference, indistinction’, p.45; see also Kheel, Nature ethics, pp.249–
50. 
59
 Oliver, ‘What is wrong with (animal) rights?’, p.218. 
60
 Francione’s work has been especially vehement in this regard. His insistence on challenging the status of 
OTHAS as property goes well beyond what so-called animal welfarist positions even aspire to achieve (see 
Francione, Animals as persons: Essays on the abolition of animal exploitation (New York: Columbia Univrsity 
Press, 2008); ‘Animal welfare and the moral value of nonhuman animals’, esp. p. 34). 
61
 Calarco, ‘Identity, difference, indistinction’, p.45. 
62
 See Donovan, ‘Animal rights and feminist theory’, Signs, 15, 2 (1990), 350–75, for an especially astute 
criticism of Regan and Singer’s attitudes towards ‘emotion’ as playing a legitimate, constitutive role – as 
opposed to reason – in ethics. As Bailey’s more recent article, ‘On the backs of animals’, identifies, the 
extent of these theorists’ inability to countenance the relevance of ‘emotion’ to ethical theory is evidenced 
by their misunderstanding even of Donovan’s critique.  
63
 Calarco, ‘Identity, difference, indistinction’, p.45. 
64
 See e.g., Luce Irigaray, Speculum of the other woman, trans Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca, NY: New York University 
Press, 1985), and her key text, An ethics of sexual difference, trans. Carolyn Burke and Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press). 
 19 
philosophies have often emerged precisely to counter animal ethics that 
emphasize identity. As Elisa Aaltola notes: 
 
it has been claimed that the search for similarity is itself part of 
anthropocentric morality, since only those like us are valuable. It also has 
been claimed that true respect for animals comes from recognising their 
difference and ‘otherness’, not from seeing similarities.65  
 
  
 Aaltola finds philosophies of animal difference wanting, arguing that 
while they are ‘right in demanding respect’ for differences, they remain 
problematic, and too vague. Oliver’s main concern is the significant problem 
that ‘if recent philosophies of difference are any indication, we can 
acknowledge difference without acknowledging our dependence on animals, or 
without including animals in ethical considerations’.66 This begs the question 
of how desirable a philosophy is that doesn’t positively change the lived 
treatment and experiences of OTHAS.  
 Notoriously, when ostensibly considering his cat as an other,67 the best-
known philosopher of difference, Jacques Derrida, omits ‘[a]ctually to respond 
to the cat’s response to his presence’.68 To Haraway’s frustration (since she 
notes the positive things Derrida does do), ‘he did not seriously consider an 
alternative form of engagement [to speech]… one that risked knowing 
something more about cats and how to look back…’.69  
                                                 
65
 Elisa Aaltola, ‘“Other animal ethics” and the demand for difference’, Environmental Values, 11, 2 (2002), 
193–209 (p.193). 
66
 Kelly Oliver, ‘Animal ethics: Toward an ethics of responsiveness’, Research in Phenomenology, 40, 2 
(2010), 267–80 (p.267). 
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 See Jacques Derrida, ‘The animal that therefore I am (more to follow)’, trans. David Wills, Critical Inquiry, 
28, 2 (2002), 369–418. Note that Deleuze and Guatarri are similarly problematic, when, despite their 
radically anti-Cartesian concept of ‘becoming-animal’, ‘show little concern for actual animals’ – something 
compounded by their use of the concept to reconceive the human subject: see Oliver, Animal lessons, 4. In 
contrast, see Janet M. Alger and Steven F. Alger, Cat culture: The social world of a cat shelter (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 2003); the Algers do what Derrida fails to: it investigates how cats communicate, 
thereby making up part of ‘the developing knowledge of both cat-cat and cat-human behavioral semiotics’ 
to which Haraway refers in criticizing Derrida: Donna Haraway, When species meet (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2008), p.22. 
68
 Donna Haraway, When species meet, p.22. 
69
 Donna Haraway, ‘Encounters with companion species: Entangling dogs, baboons, philosophers, and 
biologists’, Configurations, 14, 1-2 (2006), 97–114 (p.103); see also Traci Warkentin, ‘Interspecies etiquette: 
An ethics of paying attention to animals’, Ethics & the Environment, 15, 1 (2010), 101–21 (p.102). 
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 Another problem with difference philosophies is their failure to 
recognize differences between OTHAs – tending to lump them all together, 
thereby replicating the very dichotomy they seek to reject.70 This arises 
perhaps from these philosophies’ roots in feminist concerns with sexual 
difference, which revolves around a masculine/feminine binary. Merleau-
Ponty provides a potential way past this dichotomous view of difference: just 
as his philosophy allows for ‘expanding the asymmetry between the sexes to 
various gender identities’,71 so I’d argue it offers ways to expand the ‘animal’ 
side of the human/animal dichotomy. 
 ‘Philosophies of difference’ are, though – in isolation – arguably 
inadequate to overcome anthropocentrism. I concur with Oliver that so-called 
animal ethics ‘requires rethinking both identity and difference’, and that this 
might be best done ‘by focusing on relationships and responsivity’; the aim is 
not to suggest an ‘animal ethics’, but to show that ethics is transformed by 
considering OTHAs.72  
 However, I don’t think the concept of ‘difference’ is redundant: Luce 
Irigaray, whilst well aware of the problems, still argues that embracing 
difference can be liberatory. In The Way of Love, for instance, she locates 
difference as the ‘decisive instrument’ via which (human) identity might ‘giv[e] 
up its artificial and authoritarian unity’ and ‘find itself compelled to a 
cultivation of the relation with the other that it had neglected’.73 Significantly, 
both Emmanuel Levinas and Merleau-Ponty agree with Irigaray that self-other 
relations are asymmetrical (‘because they assume a lived relation to the other 
that can never become symmetrical’),74 hence there are always differences 
between self and other.75 So, despite the limitations of philosophies of 
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 Oliver, Animal lessons, p.4. 
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 Silvia Stoller, ‘Asymmetrical genders: Phenomenological reflections on sexual difference’, Hypatia, 20, 2 
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 Oliver, ‘Animal ethics’, p.267. 
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difference, the concept arguably still has an important role to play in moving 
beyond androcentric anthropocentrism.  
 
V. Indistinction: Imagining Non-anthropocentrism 
Indistinction refers to ‘new modes of thought and practice beyond the 
human/animal distinction’, and beyond philosophies of sameness and 
difference.76 On Calarco’s account, to genuinely embrace indistinction is both 
ontologically and existentially radical: ultimately, it’s a thought and practice 
that – to succeed – must ‘reorient us along lines that enable alternative modes 
of living, relating, and being with others of all sorts (human and nonhuman)’;77 
ways that are perhaps at present hard to conceptualize, let alone actualize.  
 However, even a cursory look at the ways in which humans and various 
other animals do live alongside each other suggests indistinction’s not an 
impossible aim: from the relationships between reindeer and ‘reindeer 
nomads’ in Siberia78 and between Jane Goodall and the chimpanzees she lived 
alongside,79 to the rare but enlightening cases of humans raised by wolves and 
gazelles,80 there is abundant evidence that OTHAs and humans not only can 
communicate effectively, but can live in ‘mixed communities’ well beyond 
those Mary Midgley describes81 – given conditions in which rigid 
human/animal and animal/environment boundaries are not enforced.  
                                                                                                                                                    
issue. (It’s worth noting that M-P has been criticized for androcentrism: see e.g., Judith Butler, ‘Sexual 
ideology and phenomenological description: A feminist critique of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of 
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 To develop thought and practice genuinely ‘beyond’ the human/animal 
distinction is a quite different approach from embracing human-OTHA identity 
or difference: 
 
The chief task of such work is neither to extend moral consideration to 
animals based on the sharing of classical human capacities and abilities 
nor to underscore endlessly the reductionism of traditional discourse on 
the difference between humans and animals. Instead, this alternative 
approach proceeds from a space in which supposedly insuperable 
distinctions between human beings and animals fall into a radical 
indistinction and where the human/animal distinction (in both its classical 
and more complicated deconstructive form) no longer serves as a 
guardrail for thought and practice.82  
 
 Indistinction perhaps best describes the kind of ethics and ontology this 
dissertation proposes. It also suggests, to me, the uselessness of dichotomizing 
‘identity’ and ‘difference’ – suggesting that instead, the two experiences those 
terms attempt to evoke are always-already, in lived experience, constantly 
interrelated and interweaving, as we embodied beings are constantly 
experiencing others of all sorts as simultaneously ‘the same as’ and ‘different 
from’ us. The philosophical – and ethical – significance of this is something I 
discuss later, especially in examining (i) Milton’s concept of egomorphism, and 
(ii) Merleau-Ponty’s later ontology, which develops from the realization that 
humans and OTHAs share one ‘flesh’, the indivisibility of which entails human-
animal ‘intertwining’.83 
*** 
The quotation displayed at the start of this chapter reminds us that ‘we are 
only now embarking on an attempt to move beyond anthropocentrism’, and at 
this time it remains difficult to imagine what lies ahead. Remembering there 
was a (long) time when ‘respect for persons, and persons themselves, were far 
less secure – not fixed, secure, or “natural” as they now seem’,84 draws 
attention to the historical specificity of such concepts that animal rights 
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philosophers, in particular, rely on for their approach. It also indicates why 
ecocentric holist philosophers have been able to challenge notions like 
‘person’, and how, in turn, contemporary thinkers can challenge that notion 
and others from a different perspective – one that privileges neither humans 
nor the ecosystem at the expense of other-than-human individuals. The 
significance of this in hoping to move ‘beyond’ anthropocentrism cannot be 
overemphasized given that contemporary western thought is inevitably 
shaped and limited by its emergence in and from a markedly anthropocentric 
context dating from at least the so-called Enlightenment, and arguably far 
earlier.85 (As Chapter 2 acknowledges, though, the hegemony of 
anthropocentrsim was far from inevitable, and there has frequently been 
resistance to it.86) 
 I agree that currently ‘even the best nonanthropocentric theories … are 
still profoundly shaped by and indebted to the anthropocentrism that they 
officially oppose’;87 hence my concern to interrogate philosophies that assert 
their non-anthropocentrism but which under closer scrutiny are revealed as 
more or less anthropocentric. To move ‘beyond’ anthropocentrism, it’s 
essential to grasp what must be let go. This is important to highlight here, 
given the emphasis I’ve placed on the ‘failings’ of the environmental and animal 
ethics discussed thus far.  
 But I also agree that ‘nonanthropocentric speculation’ is important;88 
therefore, I focus below less on critiquing anthropocentric aspects of the ideas 
under investigation, and increasingly on drawing out their positive, non-
anthropocentric potential. 
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VI. Ethics as First Philosophy  
In referring to ethics as ‘first philosophy’, I deliberately evoke Levinas, who 
argues that our never-ending obligation to ‘the Other’ renders ethics 
foundational to philosophy, and whose ethics some argue include OTHAs,89 
despite Levinas’s personal ambivalence about ‘animals’.90 However, especially 
as others already provide impressive insight about his potential for animal and 
environmental ethics,91 I don’t focus on Levinas here. Instead, I focus on the 
wider notion that ethics is primary.  
 Amongst others, Iris Murdoch stands out as sharing Levinas’s belief in 
the primacy of ethics, and that ‘the self is the enemy not only of the other, but 
of authentic existence’.92 More recently, in the field of environmental 
philosophy, Jim Cheney and Anthony Weston proposed an approach to 
philosophy that puts ethics first – emphasizing that ethics comes before 
knowledge.93 Setting out to re-write western ethics, they conclude that ‘it may 
after all be our comportment that is the single most crucial thing’.94 This 
suggests that it’s precisely how we return the Other’s look (Levinas); how we 
see an other justly, honestly, and compassionately, in the process moving ‘away 
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from universality’95(Murdoch), that constitutes ethics. This involves a radical 
rethinking of dominant views of ethics in western philosophy and culture.96 To 
do this claim some justice, but without the space to engage in a thorough 
explication of all these philosophies, I focus here on outlining Cheney and 
Weston’s thought.  
 Cheney and Weston set out their proposal by focusing on four 
underlying assumptions they identify as central, and offering alternatives to 
each. In summary, they propose that: 
 
(1) ‘Ethical action is first and foremost an attempt to open up possibilities, to 
enrich the world’ rather than ‘a response to our knowledge of the world’;97  
(2) ‘Hidden possibilities surround us at all times’ because ‘the world has barely 
unfolded for us’; this in contrast to assumptions that world is ‘readily 
knowable … to the extent required for ethical response’;98 
(3) ‘Ethics is pluralistic, dissonant, discontinuous’, rather than ‘inherently an 
incremental and extensionist business’; hence ‘ethical discovery is always 
possible’;99 and 
(4) ‘The task of ethics is to explore and enrich the world’; ‘Rather than sorting 
relatively fixed-natured things into relatively well-established categories of 
considerability… what is asked of us, insofar as we can manage it, is an open-
ended, nonexclusive consideration of everything: people, bacteria, rocks, 
animals, everything, insofar as we can’ (what Tom Birch calls universal 
considerability).100 
 
This results in ethics that emphasize both that the life-world is not entirely 
‘knowable’, and that all knowledge is ethics-based, is value-laden. It’s clear 
even from this four-point outline the extent to which Cheney and Weston’s 
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model refutes the assumptions and strategies of the ecocentric and animal 
ethics considered above.  
Illustrating how some ‘non-western’ peoples understand ethics, and 
investigating the role of ‘[t]he written word’ in conspiring ‘with the visual 
metaphor to turn the world into a passive object for human knowledge’, 
Cheney and Weston ultimately argue that the primary, embodied nature of 
ethics means that practice is not ‘applied’ ethics, but ‘constitutive of ethics 
itself, our very mode of access to the world’s possibilities’.101 Hence they 
conclude that etiquette and comportment are ‘genuine means of discovery’102 – 
arguing that it’s only via actual, practical etiquette – returning an OTHA’s look 
(which Derrida failed to do); using the Other’s name; embracing instinctive, 
shared bodily responses – that we can develop a non-anthropocentric ethics. 
Hence, they: 
 
oppose the usual view that puts knowledge of animals, for instance, before 
any possible (serious, intellectually respectable) ethical response to them. 
On our view, we can have no idea of what other animals are actually 
capable until we approach them ethically.103 
 
They ultimately suggest that this kind of courtesy – bodily etiquette and 
respectful comportment – might be ‘the environmental-philosophical 
challenge of the future’.104 This view is echoed by others, for instance 
Kennan Ferguson who writes that ‘we can learn from those who love 
their pets [and other OTHAs] that communication is not limited to 
abstract thoughts or human speech, but can and does happen in startling 
places and across surprising boundaries’ – and that people’s love for 
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OTHAs requires ‘new formulations of the roles of ethics and 
philosophy’.105 
 While Calarco cites Cheney and Weston in making his case for reading 
Levinasian ethics as ‘committed to a notion of universal ethical consideration, 
that is, an agnostic form of ethical consideration that has no a priori constraints 
or boundaries’,106 I remain sceptical that Levinas’s ethics require non-
anthropocentrism, given his position that ‘[e]thics is … against nature’.107 
Cheney and Weston’s emphasis on the ethical importance of our comportment 
nonetheless resonates with Murdoch’s and Levinas’s ethics. It’s also echoed in 
ideas proposed by Merleau-Ponty and others, as discussed below.  
 
*** 
Calarco suggests that western philosophy is now starting to acknowledge and 
address what Levinas – and western philosophy more generally – ‘tried 
desperately but unsuccessfully to block or dissimulate’; that is, ‘the simple fact 
that we know neither what animals can do nor what they might become’.108 
This is crucially important to moving ‘beyond’ anthropocentrism.  
 The insistence that we must ask similar questions about OTHAs and 
environment to those we ask about humans is foundational to the discussion in 
Chapter 2. To do this, a genuine effacement of human/animal and 
animal/environment dichotomies is necessary: only via such a decentring of 
humans, can anthropocentric philosophy be succeeded by non-anthropocentric 
thought and practice. A major obstacle here is the pervasiveness of beliefs in 
precisely ‘the order of biology’, in ‘biological drives’, as separate and separable 
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from being human, and from being ethical. This is why, arguably, ‘even’ 
philosophies as radical as Francione’s and Levinas’s are, ultimately, beholden 
to quite historically-specific and particular forms of scientific belief – not least 
those promulgated by neo-Darwinists and sociobiologists; the kinds of belief 
that Merleau-Ponty, amongst others, rejects, and which I challenge in the 
following chapter.
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Chapter 2: 
PHILOSOPHY, THE ANTHROPOCENTRISM OF ‘SCIENCE’, 
AND THE ‘PROBLEM’ OF ANTHROPOMORPHISM 
 
Anthropocentrism queries: Why do animals cross the road we build? 
Rather than Why do we build the roads where animals cross? (Hwa Yol 
Jung, 2007)109 
 
 
This chapter addresses how a problematically anthropocentric worldview is 
promulgated not just by philosophers, but by ‘science’ and, importantly, ways 
in which a ‘scientific’ worldview is represented and reified in western 
philosophy and wider culture. I outline how my earlier examples illustrate this, 
consider the role of particularly sociobiology in perpetuating an 
anthropocentric worldview, and investigate alternative views. 
 
I. Knowing about Bambi 
 
What the philosopher can note – what provokes his thought – is that 
precisely those … who maintain a Cartesian representation of the world 
admit their ‘preferences,’ just as a musician or a painter would speak of his 
preferences for a style. (Merleau-Ponty, 1968)110 
 
Eaton’s essential argument, as set out in her criticism of Bambi, is that if we 
want to know what a deer (for instance) is really like, then we must look not to 
experience, emotion, imagination and fiction, but only to western science; in 
particular, to ecology. She holds that only scientific knowledge enables us to 
see through the fiction that Bambi presents when it tells us that deer ‘never 
fight for food [the fiction she says arises from Bambi’s mother telling him, ‘we 
never kill anything’], because there is enough for all’. Eaton’s claim is that this 
                                                 
109
 Hwa Yol Jung, ‘Merleau-Ponty’s transversal geophilosophy and sinic aesthetics of nature’, in Merleau-
Ponty and environmental philosophy: Dwelling on the landscapes of thought, ed. by Suzanne L. Cataldi and 
William S. Hamrick (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2007), pp. 235–55 (p.251). 
110
 Merleau-Ponty, The visible and the invisible, p.17. 
 30 
is ‘totally false’ and, in contrast, only knowledge obtained through ecology can 
‘teach children about the actual effect of over-population of deer in the 
forest’.111  
 Eaton ignores that a story might be written – indeed, probably has been, 
by now – which tells children about the issue and effect of over-population 
(even if Bambi is not that story). More significant, though, is her glossing over 
the ‘whole story’ – that is, as implicit in Leopold’s story, that despite her use of 
the passive voice in telling us the ecological ‘truth’ that deer (the species) ‘has 
come to dominate’ certain ecological systems in the US, this results from 
humans’ domination of those systems (by building on the land, mining and 
farming it, poisoning the water, etc.) –  specifically by hunting and killing off 
numerous predators, and by further encouraging growth in deer numbers so 
that hunters have targets for their sport (see Figure 1). Given that Eaton 
actually mentions this latter point earlier in her article,112 it seems remarkable 
that she elides it in her scathing critique of what Bambi’s mother says and its 
‘scientific’ veracity.   
 My point here is that Eaton’s anthropocentrism entails a wilful blindness 
to the partial nature of the ‘story’ she chooses to tell in the name of the science 
that she, along with other proponents of a science-led approach to nature, and 
to ethics, claim to be ‘objective’ – untainted by the partiality they lay 
exclusively at the door of imagination, fiction, emotion and other approaches 
that don’t prioritize, precisely, a ‘scientific’ worldview.113 This reveals that the 
‘knowledge’ afforded by western science – ecology, here – is as open to 
interpretation as fiction and imagination. This is a point made quite 
emphatically by philosopher Donna Haraway, amongst others – where 
Haraway has argued persuasively that the so-called objective facts of science 
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depend on the interpretive framework of theory,114 and, more specifically, that 
knowledge, data and evidence are produced by the perceptions, methodologies 
and languages of those asserting them.115 
 The ecocentric holist perspective (re)presented by Eaton does not allow 
that science is, far from being objective, one form of storytelling amongst 
many.116 Resistance to this by those who reify science illustrates the 
widespread acceptance of the assumption of western ethics that ethics (must 
or should) come after and ‘from’ knowledge, rather than being always already 
shaped by ethics. It also indicates the perceptiveness of Thomas Heyd’s point 
that ‘[t]he illusion that science is not driven by values … can only be upheld by 
being so deeply involved in its world picture that one lacks the capacity for 
critical scrutiny of what science is’.117  
 Rolston recognizes that ecology is not the only significant discourse. 
Nevertheless, he reifies it in his response to the dead elk. Perhaps more 
obvious in Rolston’s description of a corpse than in Eaton’s exasperation at the 
‘misinformation’ promulgated by Bambi, however – although evident in both 
texts – is the decidedly sharp boundary between how they choose to apply 
‘science’ to OTHAs and to humans: Rolston nowhere, for instance, meditates on 
the ‘ecological beauty’ of a human corpse – revealing that, as Kheel ably 
demonstrates, he draws a sharp distinction between human beings and (all) 
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OTHAs.118 Eaton assumes a similarly clear human/animal boundary – 
unsurprisingly, given these thinkers’ reliance on western science for their 
beliefs about OTHAs; beliefs that reveal such science’s commitment to 
maintaining precisely that boundary (in the formation of which, that same 
science played a key role). Below, I investigate further this boundary-making 
and maintaining – often implemented via a vehement resistance to 
‘anthropomorphism’ – considering both its philosophical significance 
(especially to ethics), and its prevalence despite science’s own ever-increasing 
evidence of human-OTHA continuity.119  
 
II. The ‘Problem’ of Anthropomorphism 
 
how should we interpret the apparently similar signs of consciousness, 
care, and empathy observed in animals without falling into “heresies” of 
either anthropomorphism or anthropocentrism? In its eagerness to avoid 
the former, contemporary biology has often been drawn into the 
dogmatism of the latter. (Jickling and Paquet, 2005)120 
 
 
As Jickling and Paquet’s comment suggests, the fear of ‘committing’ 
anthropomorphism – i.e., of attributing ‘human’ characteristics to animals on 
the other side of the human/animal dichotomy – is deeply entrenched in 
contemporary biology. Hence, anthropomorphism is defined as something to 
be avoided. This remains the case despite evidence of human-OTHA continuity, 
as mentioned above: key to this apparent discrepancy is that even while areas 
of biology such as ethology provide such evidence, and ‘thinking about animal 
minds does begin to accord them some respect’, some ethologists veer towards 
reductivist, mechanistic explanations, and ethology ‘remains embedded in the 
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rhetoric and practice of science’.121 Therefore, such evidence alone cannot 
undo the human/animal dichotomy.  
 Considered, currently,122 to be the attribution to other-than-human 
entities of any human characteristic, this definition of ‘anthropomorphism’ is 
problematic when invoked as a criticism – precisely because such attribution 
‘is only a mistake if those animals lack those characteristics’.123 A more 
accurate definition of anthropomorphism (as generally used by those who 
denigrate it), might be the attribution to other-than-humans of characteristics 
that belong exclusively to humans.124  
 The scientific characterization of anthropomorphism as bambi-ization, 
as sentimental, and as uncritical – as ‘projecting’ exclusively human 
characteristics onto OTHAs that bear no relation to scientific ‘reality’ – is 
inherently demeaning to OTHAs, and privileging to humans. When the term is 
coined, the assumption is generally not that OTHAs’ characteristics are simply 
‘different’ to humans’, but that they are lesser than humans’ – because OTHAs 
are mechanistic, devoid of emotions or other characteristics equivalent to 
those of humans. Such an attitude is clearly articulated by J.S. Kennedy, a key 
proponent of this view.  
 In The New Anthropomorphism, Kennedy opens with the startling 
assertion that he wouldn’t wish us to entirely de-anthropomorphize OTHAs; 
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however, this is only because he believes a certain level of anthropomorphizing 
is ‘built into us’ culturally and genetically – for adaptive purposes, he claims.125 
His main concern remains to ‘liberate’ humans – especially scientists – from 
anthropomorphizing that doesn’t serve a culturally or genetically adaptive 
purpose. He thus laments that 
 
our penchant for anthropomorphic interpretations of animals is a drag on 
the scientific study of the causal mechanisms of it. There is an inescapable 
ambiguity and inner conflict in the students of animal behaviour to 
anthropomorphism … If the study of animal behaviour is to mature as a 
science, the process of liberation from the delusions of anthropomorphism 
must go on.126 
 
Hence, scientists are taught to avoid anthropomorphism at all costs; to 
‘keep a constant vigil against anthropomorphic thinking and 
interpretation when performing animal research’.127 They are not – 
despite their shared ‘inner conflict’ – encouraged to consider whether 
anthropomorphism is (always) delusional; they are simply told that it is! 
 Assumptions of anthropomorphism’s complete lack of validity, and an 
evident wariness of ‘committing’ it, are abundant in scientific literature, 
especially about altruism.128 The extent to which scientists (especially 
sociobiologists) concerned with OTHAs both conceive of and try to explain 
‘altruism’ in OTHAs in ways that bear little or no resemblance to what is meant 
by the word129 is extremely revealing of how stringently they wish to draw the 
line between OTHAs and humans. Tellingly, Jorg Massen and Elisabeth Sterck, 
when investigating why ‘friendship’ is, similarly, defined very differently by 
biologists and social scientists, suggest it is because ‘a by-product of different 
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research approaches: namely social scientists focussing on proximate and 
biologists on ultimate explanations’.130 
 Some scientists do ask some similar questions about OTHAs as are asked 
about humans – or at least seem to. Frans de Waal, for one, rejects simplistic, 
sociobiological explanations of altruism amongst OTHAs,131 arguing that 
altruism in all animals can be ‘explained’ only by reference to multiple 
biological and psychological layers.132 Other ethologists call for ‘critical’ 
anthropomorphism, arguing that it is useful in understanding OTHAs.133 
However, scientists tend still to delimit the questions they ask about OTHAs to 
issues of altruism and related notions. Additionally, this ‘critical’ (use of) 
anthropomorphism is reserved – by scientists – for scientists alone; non-
scientists are considered too ‘sentimental’,134 inclined to ‘gratuitous 
anthropomorphism that projects human emotions and intentions onto animals 
without justification’.135  
 Despite the ‘prohibition’, a growing number of ethologists study OTHA 
emotions in what many colleagues regard as an anthropomorphic manner. And 
some – such as Marc Bekoff – argue that it’s inevitable, as well as legitimate:  
 
If we decide against using anthropomorphic language, we might as well 
pack up and go home because we have no alternatives. Should we talk 
about animals as a bunch of hormones, neurons, and muscles absent from 
any context…?136 
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 These ethologists’ findings suggest that far from being the wild 
imaginings of those not versed in strict scientific method, the widespread 
tendency for humans to perceive and refer to OTHAs as having thoughts and 
feelings akin to humans is well supported by evidence.137 This raises again the 
issue of why this evidence has so little impact on exploding the human/animal 
dichotomy within science and its sphere of cultural influence. One answer is 
that reserving ‘critical’ anthropomorphism for scientists is unproductive at 
best – that, as both Lynda Birke and Vandana Shiva discuss, a key problem is 
that biology (and ‘scientific knowledge’ more generally, I’d suggest) needs 
‘democratizing’.138 This would allow for more diverse ways of ‘knowing’ about 
OTHAs and other non-human entities.139  
 Because the term anthropomorphism always operates from a worldview 
that assumes a human/animal dichotomy, there is I think a problem with using 
it at all. Always already implying that characteristics it ‘attributes to’ OTHAs 
are definitively and exclusively human, this in turn implies more than just that 
there are characteristics that are exclusively human (which might well be so): 
it implies that whether or not a characteristic is human, human-like, not-
human-like or not-human is what is important in identifying and responding to 
OTHAs – that is, the term is definitively anthropocentric, with ‘human-ness’ the 
standard by which all animals are measured. Again the argument might be 
made that it’s impossible for humans to be anything other than 
anthropocentric – that we simply cannot see things differently. However, I 
insist that this is not necessarily the case.  
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 For one, this position is akin to suggesting that women cannot help but 
see things from ‘a woman’s’ perspective. That too may well be the case, but it’s 
identifying and pinpointing the ‘woman’ part of an individual’s identity that 
becomes problematic when it is privileged above all other aspects of that 
identity – since other factors (apart from being a woman) might well be more 
significant in particular experiences and encounters. For instance, being a 
European human might be more pertinent in meeting an African human for the 
first time, and age more pertinent than gender to finding common ground with 
that other. Being a forest-dweller may be more significant in first encountering 
another forest-dweller, irrespective of ‘species’, and of gender.140 Just because 
these latter aspects of being are so thoroughly familiar to us as categories of 
experience through acculturation, this doesn’t mean they’re necessarily the 
most pertinent aspects of all the ‘others’ we perceive. The particulars – and 
complexities – of any given encounter vary, underscoring the dubious status of 
claims that a human must necessarily be anthropocentric: quite apart from 
anything else, this appears not to be the case in the lived experience of many.  
 Below, I consider why science makes is so vehemently resistant to 
anthropomorphism, and what the response to that, and alternatives, might be.  
  
III. Science, Feminism, Merleau-Ponty 
 
There are two ways to consider the animal … we can either analyse the 
process of the animal under a microscope, or see a totality in the animal. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1957-8)141 
 
Despite citing ecology as primary – a science associated closely with ‘pro 
nature’ environmentalism, and which ecocentric holists in particular reify as 
crucial to our understanding the interlinked nature of ‘the biotic community’ – 
what’s evident in Eaton’s and Roston’s philosophies and in western thought 
more generally is the central role played by OTHA-focused sciences such as 
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biology, zoology and sociobiology in forming and informing concepts of ‘the 
(always impliedly non-human) animal’. These sciences are – as feminist 
philosopher-scientists Haraway, Noske, and Birke have argued – not only 
problematic in themselves, but shape attitudes towards OTHAs across the 
sciences and in other spheres of thought, including social sciences and 
philosophy. Like Merleau-Ponty, though, these philosopher-scientists don’t 
wish to reject science altogether, recognizing that since ‘meaning is biologically 
based … not a product of mentality’, science is one way in which philosophers 
might legitimately learn more about the life-world.142 But they do challenge its 
restricted worldview, and especially its foundations in materialism and 
anthropocentrism. 
 In Beyond Boundaries,143 Noske presents ‘a critique of animal 
objectification and a quest for their “resubjectification”’,144 focusing on human-
OTHA relations in history, and especially the role science has played. Her 
discussion is wide-ranging, but I’m interested here in her critique of 
contemporary sociobiology as an offshoot of neo-Darwinism, and its role in 
promulgating and widening the human/animal and animal/environment 
divides that Darwin had arguably narrowed.145 This echoes one of Merleau-
Ponty’s explicit concerns: how neo-Darwinism ‘profoundly modified’ Darwin’s 
model, in the process radically altering ‘the conception of selection’ and 
delimiting its approach to ‘the problem of Being’.146 
 Taking up points made by Haraway, Noske argues that what modern 
science calls ‘nature’ includes only parts of ‘natural reality’ – the parts that 
scientists ‘think they can be objective about’, thereby relegating other aspects 
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of nature as ‘subjective’ and ‘unscientific’.147 As she argues, the key problem 
here is that for most scientists – and hence a culture that privileges scientific 
discourse – this restricted, partial understanding of what constitutes nature 
comes to represent all of nature.148 This resonates with Merleau-Ponty’s 
description of ‘classical science’ as ‘a form of perception which loses sight of its 
origins and believes itself complete’.149 His view, like Noske’s, is that there is 
much more to life than that identified ‘under a microscope’. 
 Critiquing sociobiology in particular – given its central role in studying 
OTHAs and popularizing ideas about them – Noske attacks its highly 
reductivist approach, treating as it does, ‘all animal behaviour as connected 
with adaptation and gene transmission’,150 and presenting a biological 
determinism that resists – often, elides utterly – the workings of sociality and 
culture. Noske also illustrates the ways in which sociobiologists and their 
biological paradigm151 treat OTHAs as objects (as opposed to human-subjects), 
defining actions as ‘mechanisms of living matter governed by natural laws’. 
Centrally, she shows how social scientists mostly also treat OTHAs like this – 
criticizing ‘the biobehavioural sciences for their reductionist approach, but 
only if applied to humans’.152  
 Her view of this situation – like mine – is that it’s untenable as well as 
unethical: as she asks,153 why accept the reductivist caricatures of OTHAs when 
we reject such caricatures of humans? At the same time, noting that 
sociobiologists such as E.O. Wilson have called explicitly for the ‘biologization 
of ethics’,154 Noske explains why it might be: since OTHAs have become 
associated with purely biological explanations, ‘[i]n order to safeguard humans 
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from another onslaught of biological determinism social scientists tend to be 
quite defensive about the non-animalness of humans’.155 
 Noske argues that the threat of ethics as biological tends to cause ‘even’ 
anti-sociobiologists to use the human/animal boundary to defend human 
exclusivity – in an attempt to refute the sociobiological claim that ‘moral 
beliefs’ are ‘mere expressions of the underlying biological state of the 
hypothalamic-limbic system’.156 That is, resistance to ‘de-humanization’ and/as 
‘biologization’ of human sociality ‘has expressed itself in protest against any 
form of human-animal comparison’ and continuity.157 Thus, sociobiology, in 
threatening humans with the same reductivism it forces onto OTHAs, mobilizes 
a masterful rhetorical device: it divides and conquers. This is something Birke 
hones in on when she mentions that in addition to ‘much sociobiological 
work… still tending towards reductionism, even … biological determinism’, the 
problem is wider than that, since ‘popularized accounts persist in picking up 
underlying messages about genes and determinism’.158 Further, and more 
generally, biologists and their populizers continue to believe that scientists 
‘objectively’ observe nature, when this is arguably an impossibility, given the 
mediation of our knowledge of the world through contemporary and 
historically anthropocentric (and androcentric) social and cultural 
understandings.159 Once more, Merleau-Ponty shares this concern, frustrated 
that ‘the biologists remain more materialist than the physicists’,160 refusing to 
see the ‘totality’ of animals.  
 It’s important to note the historical and cultural specificity of the sorts of 
claims made here, to avoid any simplistic understanding of suggestions that 
scientific knowledge is inevitably anthropocentric and androcentric. While 
humans have an always anthropocentric view in that we are human and 
therefore inevitably see from a human perspective, this need not – even if in 
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practice it definitely tends to, in contemporary culture – mean that we cannot 
(i) recognize the bias that arises from anthropocentrism and (ii) work to resist 
such bias, even managing to ‘see’ things from other-than-human perspectives 
insofar as this is possible.161 Hence, when Haraway and others argue that it’s 
impossible to observe nature ‘objectively’ because of anthropocentrism’s 
tainting of science and other knowledge forms, their claim is an historical one – 
akin to feminist claims that knowledge cannot be ‘objective’ due largely to its 
intrinsically masculinist bias. This relates back to Cheney and Weston’s 
insistence that all knowledge is coloured by ethics; science’s ‘knowledge’ is 
based on anthropocentric and androcentric worldviews, so it has inevitable 
biases. The argument is not that ‘objectivity’ is not possible because of 
anthropocentrism and androcentrism, but that it’s not possible at all as 
contemporary scientists style it; rather, all that’s ever possible is an 
intersubjectivity that eradicates as far as possible foundational biases. 
  In this context, citing Haraway Noske notes that many who oppose 
sociobiology  
 
use value-laden theoretical constructs for human and animal realities; 
they do not substitute true versions for false accounts, nor unmask 
ideologies. In their sociobiological(!) interpretation of animal behaviour 
and their anti-sociobiological interpretation of human behaviour, their 
own perception of animals as objects and of humans as persons plays a 
crucial role.162 
 
It’s therefore perhaps moot how far philosophers like Rolston and Eaton cite 
ecology or another science to support their attitudes to OTHAs: as Noske 
argues, it’s fundamentally ‘their own perception of animals as objects and of 
humans as persons’ that is crucial: their attitudes already reject the possibility 
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not just of treating OTHAs as subjective individuals, but of even the outside 
possibility of their being subjects. Leopold, Rolston, and Eaton – as well as 
Singer, Regan, and Francione – fail, certainly, to even attempt the 
phenomenological project of ‘returning to the things themselves’ – always 
eliding the anthropocentric bias founding the ‘scientific’ worldview through 
which they interpret the world. 
 As indicated above, this feminist critique of ‘science’ resonates with 
Merleau-Ponty’s thought. In particular, Merleau-Ponty shared the idea that 
science can only ever offer a partial view of the life-world;163 rejected the use of 
human reason as a standard by which to assess OTHAs;164 and held that we 
should ‘live alongside the world of animals instead of rashly denying it any 
kind of interiority’.165  
 However, keener than other phenomenologists to incorporate science’s 
insights,166 Merleau-Ponty ‘attempt[ed] a reanimation and reinterpretation of 
science by continually navigating between vitalism and mechanism without 
giving up on the meaningfulness of science’.167 Hence, as per the quotation that 
heads this section, while Merleau-Ponty allows that we can analyse a body – an 
animal – as process, ‘under a microscope’, he insists on the philosophical 
appropriateness of the latter approach –of seeing the totality; that ‘[t]he unity 
of the organism does not rest on the central nervous system; it must rest on 
activity’.168 
Only by reawakening immediate contact with the life-world in which we 
all participate, can we even access the ‘philosophical problem’ posed by 
activity, by behaviour – that ‘the totality is no longer describable in 
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physiological terms; it appears as emergent’.169 This is why, for Merleau-Ponty, 
considering an OTHA as its totality is far more philosophically pertinent than 
any experience we might obtain of it mediated by science alone. As he sets out 
in his Preface to The Phenomenology of Perception:  
 
To return to things themselves is to return to that world which precedes 
knowledge, of which knowledge always speaks, and in relation to which 
every scientific schematisation is an abstract and derivative sign-language, 
as is geography in relation to the countryside in which we have learnt 
beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a river is…170 
 
Not only is the ‘totality’ of each animal important, but, taking this notion 
further in his later work, Merleau-Ponty suggests that anyway ‘[w]hat exists 
are not separated animals, but an inter-animality’.171 This is deeply significant 
for philosophies of ‘indistinction’, with significant repercussions for ‘science’. 
Significant here is Merleau-Ponty’s vehemently anti-Cartesian stance, his 
rejection of the notion held dear by both western science and philosophy, that 
‘reason’ defines hu(man)s and separates us from OTHAs. In the Nature 
lectures, Merleau-Ponty argues explicitly that ‘human being is not animality + 
reason’, and that ‘this is why we are concerned with the body: before being 
reason, humanity is another corporeity’.172 
To embrace Merleau-Ponty’s ontology, then – and a feminist critique of 
science – is not to reject utterly the science so valued by many 
environmentalists and philosophers. But it is to reject the reified position their 
philosophies bestow upon science, and to challenge the damage – the violence, 
to subject-bodies – done as a result of such reification.  
Part of what must be addressed in and by science, then, is its failure (i) 
to grant subjectivity to non-humans (Noske), and (ii) to recognize the merely 
partial grasp it has of the life-world and the bodies and entities that constitute 
it (Merleau-Ponty). Science must therefore address its own resistance to what 
it terms anthropomorphism, since inherent in the prohibition of 
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anthropomorphizing is precisely the denial that OTHAs or any non-human 
entity can be a subject.    
 
IV. Egomorphism and (Inter)subjectality 
Milton argues that the term anthropomorphism is problematic primarily 
because it (i) assumes human-ness as its reference point, and (ii) implies that 
‘people understand things by attributing characteristics to’ rather than 
‘perceiving characteristics in them’.173 She argues the term is therefore best 
rejected, proposing ‘egomorphism’ as an alternative concept to understand and 
analyse what humans (and OTHAs) do when they encounter not just OTHAs, 
but ‘others’ of all sorts. 
 Centrally, Milton posits that it’s not human-ness at all, but personal 
experience (of the self and other selves) that humans recognize and respond to 
when perceiving an other’s embodied ‘selfhood’ – their Levinasian ‘face’. So, 
when I perceive emotions, feelings, expressions, moods and other 
characteristics in an OTHA, I perceive that OTHA as ‘like me’, and ‘like other 
selves’, rather than ‘human-like’.174 Egomorphism allows, then, that other-
than-human characteristics might be recognized as constitutive of selfhood. 
This immediately suggests our interactions with and understandings of OTHAs 
are not as tainted with anthropocentric bias as we so commonly assume, which 
already helps imagine a less anthropocentric worldview.175  The concept 
of egomorphism might perhaps be criticized for its focus on the ‘ego’ – 
especially from Levinasian and Murdochian perspectives, which see the self’s 
tendency to erase the reality of others as the fundamental ethical problem.176 I 
disagree: the ‘self’ on which egomorphism focuses is non-anthropocentric, 
arising from an intersubjectivity that genuinely encompasses more than just 
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human interrelations. As such, it doesn’t erase the reality of others, but rather 
builds not just a notion of selfhood, but actual selves via intersubjectivity.  
 Considering Merleau-Ponty’s insistence on the intercorporeal, embodied 
status of all animals, I propose the term ‘intersubjectality’ as more appropriate 
than ‘intersubjectivity’ in descriptions of selfhood. Drawing on Li Zehou’s 
neologism of ‘subjectality’ (zhu/ti/xing), this term underscores the ‘embodied’ 
nature of selfhood as distinct from the ‘idealization’ implied by the term 
‘subjectivity’.177 
 Egomorphism’s understanding of selfhood is, far from being ‘egotistical’, 
decidedly dependent on inter-animal intersubjectality in arriving at any 
concept of the self at all. This resonates with Merleau-Pontyan (and 
Levinasian) notions of our being essentially dependent on others – and 
especially with Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of shared embodiment, which means 
that we ‘as sensing/sensed beings, are relational beings’.178 Indeed, for 
Merleau-Ponty we start out in life linked with others, as ‘we’, only developing a 
sense of our individual self, as ‘I’, later, via relationships with others.179 
  Milton’s phenomenological position that beings discover meaning in 
their environment, that cultural constructions of meaning are based upon ‘raw 
material’ supplied by such direct perception,180 gives priority to immediate 
experience as do Levinas and Merleau-Ponty. Arguably, then, the concept of 
egomorphism describes a non-anthropocentric basis that might underpin the 
kind of embodied, ‘etiquette’-based ethics proposed by Cheney and Weston – 
and a way to make non-anthropocentric sense of neo-Levinasian notions of 
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face-to-face interactions. This is because it operates at the level of the specific, 
direct experience – not the level of abstraction that dictates that a being 
experiences and perceives others as either a ‘human’ or an ‘other-than-human’. 
To summarize, egomorphism recognizes that what we experience in an 
encounter with an individual OTHA is not a sense that OTHAs in general are 
like humans in general (although this might well emerge on reflection), ‘but a 
feeling of being understood, here and now’, by the particular OTHA.181  
 Unlike anthropomorphism’s construction of self as exclusively human, 
then, egomorphism involves OTHAs in intersubjectality, and engages a more 
relational sense of personhood and the ‘self’. Crucially, I suggest the term 
intertwines the ‘ego’ with ‘morphing’: it suggests that the ego constantly 
engages with and/as responds to others, by recognizing (aspects of) itself-and-
others in others. Hence others are not ‘an objectivity posited before a 
subject’.182 This both resonates with Levinas’s concept of ethics as an 
interruption of the ego via the face of the other, and places egomorphism’s 
worldview on all fours with Merleau-Ponty’s, emphasizing the continuous 
sense-sensing that constitutes each embodied being, and supporting his 
contention that ‘sense experience refutes the understanding of self-unity as a 
sole consciousness’.183  
 Referencing U. Neisser’s position that intersubjectivity is crucial in 
coming to know our ‘self’,184 and Antonio Damasio on the importance of feeling 
and emotions (in tandem with ‘reason’) to our sense of self,185 Milton discusses 
how we, as we do with other humans, infer feelings – and personhood – from 
external signs in OTHAs, too.186 We may not always get it right – we might 
                                                 
181
 Milton, ‘Anthropomorphism or egomorphism?’, p.266. 
182
 Alphonso Lingis, ‘Translator’s preface’, in Merleau-Ponty, The visible and the invisible, pp.xl–lvi (p.lv). 
183
 Hadley Jensen, ‘“Fleshing” out an ethic of diversity’, p.195. 
184
 Milton, ‘Anthropomorphism or egomorphism?’, pp.262–3. Echoing the critique that the term 
anthropomorphism is itself always-already unavoidably anthropocentric, Milton proposes that nothing – 
other than anthropocentrism, that is – stops Neisser’s theory, and similar ones about the human self, from 
being applicable beyond the species boundary: that is, his theory seems also to work in the interspecies 
realm wherein humans and OTHAs meet and interact. 
185
 Milton, ‘Anthropomorphism or egomorphism?’, pp.264–5. 
186
 Neisser’s model allows only for intra-species intersubjectivity in the formation of self. But it’s easy to see 
how it can be extended, as Milton argues it should be, to include inter-species interactions. Arguing that 
perceptions – understandings – of OTHAs as ‘persons’ arise in and through our interactions with them and 
 47 
misinterpret, for instance, a cat’s growl or her tensed body – but this is true not 
just for our interpretation of OTHAs, but of all others.187 
  In essence, the concept of egomorphism promotes a non-
anthropocentric sense of selfhood that is rooted in direct perception and inter-
animal intersubjectality.  
*** 
The concept of ‘anthropomorphism’ in the social and biological sciences, then, 
and in much western philosophy, seems ‘best understood as a distancing 
concept intended to obscure the real intersubjectivity that exists between 
humans and non-human animals’;188 a concept that operates to sustain the 
myth that OTHAs don’t have ‘selves’ and can therefore be used as ‘resources’ 
and excluded from ethical consideration and treated as objects. 
  In contrast, egomorphism accords with Merleau-Ponty’s later ontology, 
for which ‘all relationships necessarily begin with the intercorporeality or 
interweaving of lived bodies both human and nonhuman’.189 Merleau-Ponty 
posits intersubjectality as preceding the subjectality of self, and includes all 
embodied beings as (potentially) constitutive of intersubjectality. I therefore 
argue that understanding inter- as well as intra-species encounters via the 
concept of egomorphism (i) works against the anthropocentrism of a western 
philosophy that, via ‘inflating the human self’, ‘destroys the transversal 
                                                                                                                                                    
are essentially ‘no different… from our perceptions of our fellow human beings as persons, which also 
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“circulation” of all beings’,190 and (ii) assists in grasping Merleau-Ponty’s 
proposal that ‘the presence and awareness of diverse bodies is a building block 
for the awareness of self’.191  
 The call, then, is not to deny biology, but for simplistic, reductivist and 
determinist arguments to be rejected; for the recognition that while such 
arguments ‘do not do justice to the behaviour of humans’,192 neither do they do 
justice to the behaviour of OTHAs. This call most certainly needs to be 
extended to philosophers who fail to move beyond a sociobiologically-
influenced view of OTHAs even when they reject such views of humans – which 
is precisely what philosophers including Leopold, Eaton, and Rolston do – as 
well as to animal rightists and welfarists such as Regan and Singer who remain 
caught up in a human/animal dichotomy that anthropocentrically measures 
the value of OTHAs in terms of a hierarchy of sentience according to which 
OTHAs are all and always ‘lesser’ than humans. 
 
V. Merleau-Ponty, OTHAs, Flesh 
Concepts such as those of selfhood and inter-animality outlined above, are 
radically opposed to western scientific views which shape and are shaped by 
their insistence on a human/animal boundary, and a sharp 
animal/environment distinction. Merleau-Ponty develops these ideas still 
further in considering OTHAs. 
 In elaborating his anti-Cartesian assertion that humans are not 
‘animality + reason’, mentioned above, Merleau-Ponty focuses on the 
importance of movement and perceiving to bodies, holding that the ‘touch-
touching, seeing-seen’-ness of the body ‘has nothing in common with a 
consciousness that would descend into a body-object. It is, on the contrary, the 
wrapping of a body-object around itself… in a circuit with the world’.193 As 
such, Merleau-Ponty rejects the human/animal divide, asserting inter-
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animality and, further, that ‘the relation of the human and animality is not a 
hierarchical relation, but lateral, an overcoming that does not abolish 
kinship’.194 
Merleau-Ponty supports his seemingly strange position that we are all – 
humans, OTHAs, and less animate entities – ‘one flesh’, despite our obvious and 
numerous differences, at least in part with his theory of behaviour. Crucially, 
he argues both that ‘[b]ehavior is sunk into corporeity’ and that ‘life is not 
uniquely submitted to the principle of utility’.195 In these two ideas, 
developed even just in his lecture notes, is a powerful rejection of 
sociobiological and other claims that (i) OTHAs do not have ‘language’ so are 
lesser than humans, and that (ii) they are driven by straightforward ‘instincts’ 
without the socio-cultural complexities of humans.  
First, Merleau-Ponty’s theory of behaviour locates in movement, in 
particular, demonstrative and communicative aspects of existence. This means 
even those OTHAs apparently without ‘language’ are able to, via embodied 
movement (as do humans) to interrogate, to respond, to participate in ‘a tacit 
language’ immanent in environment, body and others.196 (This reflects my 
lived experience, certainly – and presumably that of many others.197) 
Second, Merleau-Ponty argues that ‘[l]ife is not only an organization for 
survival; there is in life a prodigious flourishing of forms, the utility of which is 
only rarely attested to and that sometimes even constitutes a danger for the 
animal’, illustrating this with several examples.198 His central point here – 
essential to embracing the one-ness of flesh – rails against a sociobiological, 
mechanistic view of all animals: it is that ‘We must criticize the assimilation of 
the notion of life to the notion of the pursuit of utility, or of an intentional 
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purpose’, because ‘What the animal shows is not utility; rather, its appearance 
manifests something that resembles our oneiric life’ – in which sexual 
ceremony, for instance, is ‘useful’, yes, but its infinite variety of expression 
belies this as its sole meaning.199  
Again there are parallels with feminist philosophers’ ideas. Merleau-
Ponty for instance makes the point that relationships between a male and 
female are not necessarily governed by ‘sexual behaviour’ (utility), but are also 
about far more: two sticklebacks in an example he uses interact as ‘fellow 
creatures’, he says, not exclusively in terms of ‘sexual behaviour’ as the 
scientists Merleau-Ponty is critiquing narrowly define the situation.200 Birke 
develops similar points, arguing that ‘how we see gender’ in OTHAs is an 
‘extrapolation from our own cultural mores’ and also partly produced ‘by the 
material practices of laboratories’ – when we should, she insists, be focusing 
instead on getting to know OTHAs as animals, relationally, not as reflections of 
ourselves and our assumptions about gender.201 
 
*** 
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of human-OTHA kinship is central to the attraction of 
his ontology to philosophers in our search for ways to overcome the 
anthropocentrisms of western thought, to develop alternative ways of thinking. 
The notion that we are ‘kin’ with OTHAs – and with all humans, not just those 
in our family – is quite radical. As Oliver argues, Merleau-Ponty’s notion of 
strange kinship ‘allows for an intimate relation based on shared embodiment 
without denying differences between lifestyles or styles of being’; and, coupled 
with his theory of stylistic differences, it’s able to acknowledge differences 
‘without allowing [them] to become the grounds for ethical or epistemological 
hierarchies of being’.202  
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 Ultimately, Merleau-Ponty brings together his ideas about ‘strange 
kinship’ and inter-animality in his notion of elemental ‘flesh’ to which the title 
of Chapter 3 alludes. Observing that our ‘environment of brute existence and 
essence is not something mysterious: we never quit it, we have no other 
environment’ – that ‘it is, whatever we may say, this world, this Being that our 
life, our science, and our philosophy inhabit’,203 Merleau-Ponty insists that  
 
all we must do is situate ourselves within the being we are dealing with, 
instead of looking at it from the outside … what we have to do is put it 
back into the fabric of our life, attend from within to the dehiscence … 
which opens it to itself and opens us upon it…204 
 
From here, Merleau-Ponty posits that we are all ‘flesh’ – not conceived as 
object, but as synergetic, emphasizing that we exist of the life-world, rather 
than in it. Importantly, flesh is not a combination of mind and matter, nor 
some kind of hybrid; it ‘is not substance’;205 ‘[w]e must not think the flesh 
starting from substances, from body and spirit – for then it would be the union 
of contradictories’.206 Instead, Merleau-Ponty proposes, ‘To designate it, we 
should need the old term “element”’, suggesting that flesh is akin to air, earth, 
fire, water –  
 
midway between the spatio-temporal individual and the idea, a sort of 
incarnate principle… The flesh is in this sense an “element” of Being.207 
  
Flesh is, then, elemental – it is the ‘thickening’ of the life-world. This ‘thickness’ 
means we’re never cut off from others, because bodies – flesh and skin – are 
synergetic, and synergy exists between as well as within organisms;208 yet ‘at 
the same time, we are separated from [others, from things] by all the thickness 
of the look and the body’.209 It’s because of this that we are distinct individuals 
– differences are embraced, as styles of being – yet simultaneously are one 
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flesh, all kin, essentially constituted by intersubjectality. Merleau-Ponty refers 
to the body-world relationship as an ‘embrace’;210 I agree with Isis Brook that 
this characterization prevents the relationship it from becoming 
overwhelming, avoiding any idea ‘of losing oneself in the world to the point of 
extinction of difference’.211 Merleau-Ponty rejects both the atomistic, Cartesian 
self, cut off from ‘the environment’, and also anthropocentric holist notions 
including the ‘Transpersonal Self’ of deep ecology.212 
 Like Oliver, I’m interested in how this notion of flesh – which develops 
from but also makes coherent, I think, his notions of inter-animality and animal 
kinship – might affect our notions of what she terms ‘ethical obligations’.213 
Brook suggests that one ‘ethical’ result is, significantly, that the notion of flesh 
enables us to 
 
resist both the intellectually indefensible notion that the world and us are 
an indistinguishable whole and the morally indefensible notion that the 
world is entirely separate from us and there for us to use…214 
 
This is, of course, extremely important for eco-phenomenologists and others 
who wish to argue, as I do, that embracing Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of flesh 
has positive ethical implications for OTHAs and less animate entities, as well as 
for humans. 
 Additionally, I think the notion of flesh as elemental is helpful in 
furthering philosophies such as Cheney and Weston’s, in providing a coherent 
basis from which to think about bodily comportment as having genuinely 
ethical dimensions, or at least potential; as being a kind of communication 
ahead of language, and ahead of science and/as knowledge. 
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*** 
All this, I think, means Merleau-Ponty shows not just that but potentially how 
we can move ‘beyond both a subject-centered ontology and a human centered 
one’215 – to an intersubjectal one – something essential to conceptualizing and 
developing a non-anthropocentric worldview and ethos.  
However, using Merleau-Ponty in this way is perhaps not without 
problems. For one, phenomenology doesn’t fully ‘avoid the problem of human 
exceptionalism’ in understanding OTHA behaviour as intentional – and this is 
true of much of Merleau-Ponty’s earlier work.216 Even in his later work, some 
anthropocentrism is evident, as is a hierarchy amongst and between humans 
and OTHAs: in The Visible and the Invisible, for instance, when discussing the 
other’s look, he writes: ‘I am frozen by a look, and if it were for example an 
animal that looked at me, I would know only a feeble echo of this 
experience’,217 and his later Nature lectures exhibit ‘a tinge of human 
exceptionalism’.218 
 Despite this, Merleau-Ponty’s ontology is full of promise. It’s clear his 
thought was continually evolving to incorporate his basic recognition of all 
embodied beings’ shared flesh. Indeed, his philosophy from the Nature lectures 
onwards – culminating in the unfinished The Visible and the Invisible – altered 
largely on this basis: centrally, as Toadvine argues, he recognized that ‘our 
intertwining with animality requires a new understanding of reflection… since 
treating the power of reflection as the distinguishing mark between humans 
and animals risks returning to a philosophy of consciousness that alienates 
humanity from life’.219 Also, his concept of ‘the flesh’ arises from an attempt to 
make cogent the whole notion of inter-animal kinship.220 Hence I’d argue that 
elements of anthropocentrism (and androcentrism) in his work are insufficient 
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to derail Merleau-Ponty’s considerable contributions to non-anthropocentrism 
– primarily because they are neither essential to nor constitutive of his 
ontology.221  
 
VI. Towards Non-anthropocentrism 
Globally, a great many individuals (some philosophers included) do resist a 
mainstream, ‘scientific’ interpretation of how other-than-humans are treated – 
especially where this view involves an evident lack of moral regard for OTHAs 
and environment. This is particularly visible in the UK at the moment, for 
instance, in widespread opposition to both the proposed badger cull and the 
re-legalization of fox hunting, and has just this month (March 2013) come to 
the fore in public outcry against a recently reported proposal that more than 
half the deer population in the UK ‘needs’ to be culled.222 Contra Leopold, 
Rolston, Eaton and others – including a number of animal welfarists – views 
are frequently expressed that the ‘science’ behind such assertions should be 
challenged – ignored, even – in the face of such unethical proposed acts of what 
is increasingly being seen and described as murder, or at least ‘killing’, rather 
than ‘culling’. This shows that such issues are at least being actively contested 
in contemporary society, and at most that a shift to non-anthropcentrism might 
be a realistic, if still distant, prospect. (I should add that the ‘historical context’ 
in which I place us is not restricted to recent decades, nor is it meant to suggest 
chronological ‘progress’ towards non-anthropocentrism. At various times and 
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in various places, anthropocentrism has been less pervasive ‘even’ in the west. 
Further, despite and alongside Aristotle, Descartes, the Enlightenment, and 
contemporary sociobiology’s influence, there has been and likely always will 
be resistance to such a worldview, as philosophers and cultural theorists have 
shown.223) 
Weston also foregrounds that our attempts to grasp, articulate and 
achieve non-anthropocentric worldviews and ethics call for – indeed, require – 
the use of metaphor, exploration,224 inventiveness, openness, and so forth. 
Thus he suggests that when we’re asked to consider a snake, a tree, or a 
mountainside as having a ‘face’, or the planet as a ‘person’, these are 
‘suggestive and open-ended sorts of challenges … rather than attempts to 
demonstrate particular conclusions on the basis of premises that are supposed 
to already be accepted’; they are ‘creative more than summative’ arguments.225 
Relatedly, he also proposes that we likely need to create and experience ‘actual, 
physical spaces for the emergence of trans-human experience, places within 
which some return to the experience of and immersion in natural settings is 
possible’ before we can develop our understanding of non-
anthropocentrism.226 This echoes Merleau-Ponty’s notion, cited above, that we 
must ‘situate ourselves within the being we are dealing with’, putting it ‘back 
into the fabric of our life’.227 
 
*** 
Finally, Weston’s brief assessment of Callicott, below, provides a useful way to 
look ‘back’ at my earlier comments on contemporary conflicts between 
ecocentric holists and animal ethicists. It also reminds us of the sheer 
complexity of the issues faced by humans who have, for hundreds of years at 
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least, exploited, tortured and murdered OTHAs as well as many fellow humans, 
and wrecked havoc on our shared environment:  
 
In environmental ethics, we arrive at exactly the opposite view from that 
of J. Baird Callicott, for example, who insists that we attempt to formulate, 
right now, a complete, unified, even ‘closed’ (his term) theory of 
environmental ethics.228 
 
This move away from what Callicott and others in ‘environmental ethics’ and 
what Singer, Regan and others in ‘animal ethics’ have been doing, is 
fundamental to this dissertation.  
Hence, having spent time ‘refuting’ anthropocentrism, I wish to heed 
Weston’s warning that spending too much time so doing risks allowing it to 
‘dominate our energies’.229 In the final chapter, then, my aim is to engage more 
fully in proposing – if only in outline form – positive alternatives for moving 
beyond anthropocentrism, towards an ontology of flesh.  
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Chapter 3: 
ONTOLOGY AND ETHICS, FLESH AND AIR: 
BEING AND MOTIVATION BEYOND 
ANTHROPOCENTRISM  
 
[C]onsidering animals necessarily transforms how we consider ourselves. 
(Kelly Oliver, 2009)230 
 
 
My focus in this chapter is on the promise of Merleau-Ponty’s thought, and on 
developments of it, and other philosophies, that embrace 
nonanthropocentrism perhaps even more fully than he does. Since (i) his 
books contains not a method, but ‘a caution against what is commonly called 
method’,231 (ii) his own thought developed quite clearly towards an ever-less-
anthropocentric worldview, and, (iii) additionally, his untimely death means 
that the later ontology he started to articulate ‘shall now come only from [his] 
readers’,232 approaching Merleau-Ponty in this flexible way is entirely 
appropriate – and less problematic than in the case of a more closed theory, 
such as that of Levinas.  
 In Chapter 2, I outlined Merleau-Ponty’s ideas about selfhood, OTHAs, 
and ‘flesh’. Below, I suggest ways of ‘fleshing out’ Merleau-Ponty’s later 
ontology – noting his influence on a number of contemporary philosophers 
who style themselves ‘eco-phenomenologists’, and drawing on their work. I 
also investigate the pressing issues of epistemophilia and of how ethical 
behaviour might be motivated in and by an ontology of the flesh.  
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I. The Promise of Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology 
 
Only a reconceptualization of our place and role in nature can work 
against this tragic disconnection from ourselves and from the wellspring 
of our being. (Charles Brown and Ted Toadvine, 2003)233 
 
Given the now fairly widespread view amongst philosophers that we humans 
have constituted ourselves directly in opposition to nature, and as a result 
behave in ways damaging to our environment, the view expressed, above, by 
Brown and Toadvine identifies what has motivated philosophers of 
environment, animals and ethics to look to Merleau-Ponty for assistance – 
because his later ontology offers precisely the reconceptualization many of 
them seek. It seems, then, that his ‘ontology of the flesh has generated a 
heightened awareness of, and appreciation for, what his later texts say and 
imply about Nature and our place within it’,234 and what this means for eco-
phenomenologists and their environmental concerns.  
 Central to Merleau-Ponty’s ontology is a radical decentring of humans in 
the life-world. It locates humans as not just ‘part of nature’ in a superficial 
sense (in the Judaeo-Christian sense where we are simultaneously ‘above’ 
nature, as its ‘caretakers’, for instance, nor in the sense where we are part of 
nature but for the addition of ‘reason’), but in an essential sense, whereby 
humans along with all beings ‘live a natural environment more than we live in 
it’,235 intertwined and intertwining. 
The problem of finding the language to adequately express this bound-
up-ness, the one-flesh-ness of humans and/as environment is challenging.236 
But Merleau-Ponty’s thought is attractive not despite but in some sense 
because of the difficulties articulating it presents – because the difficulties 
suggest just how radical is its potential for change, if we act on it. This last 
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point has, though, causes several contemporary philosophers some concern: 
Monika Langer, for instance, celebrates Merleau-Ponty’s genuinely 
nondualistic ontology, but ultimately notes that ‘[t]he question at hand is 
whether descriptive critiques and the development of new ontologies suffice, 
given the evident urgency of the environmental problems’,237 while Don 
Marietta writes: ‘An environmental ethic will not be adequate if it is an 
abstraction that does not engage a person’s thought and feeling and result in 
the adoption of a way of living’.238  
To some extent, I address these concerns – or at least indicate how they 
might be addressed – in my discussion of motivating ethical behaviour, below. 
What’s essential to note, though, is that embracing Merleau-Ponty’s ontology 
arguably does not in and of itself require ethical consequences at all, as 
Toadvine has argued.239 However, I propose that the ontology we embrace, 
how we think about what is, can and arguably does radically alter our 
conception of ethics, as it alters our very experience of our relationship to 
environment and the various ‘others’ who share and constitute the life-world 
with us.  
My position draws on Kheel’s argument that what is desirable is not so 
much a world in which no harm is done to OTHAs and ‘nature’ more widely, 
but a world in which it is unthinkable to do such harm.240 This goal requires a 
radical ontological shift, since the ‘underlying oppressive structures’ of 
anthropocentrism and androcentrism arguably must be dismantled not by 
reason but by undermining the beliefs and practices (here, the depersonalising 
of OTHAs and less animate entities, and the treatment of them as object-
resources) that support them. This is because, I argue, oppressive structures 
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arise not via reason but in the pre-epistemological realm – that of direct 
experience, including of others’ faces, and hence of ethics. 
This may not offer an immediate ‘solution’ to problems that are the focus 
of environmental and animal ethics; but it is, I argue, essential to recognize if 
we’re to ever genuinely overcome our anthropocentrism, to orient ourselves 
towards nature ‘at the level of our bodily engagement with the perceived’241 
rather than forever distancing ourselves via reflection and reason.  
Despite this, I consider below ways in which elements of Merleau-
Ponty’s ontology might potentially motivate ethical behaviour towards OTHAs 
and environment, even in the contemporary milieu in which the dominant 
ontology is not conducive to such an ethos. I believe that such imaginings – as 
Cheney and Weston suggest – are essential to propose and promote, in order to 
encourage and enable any future ontological shift that sees human culture 
embracing the notion of one flesh as its norm. 
 
II. Motivating Non-anthropocentric Ethical Behaviour  
The question is – echoing concerns cited above – how might a non-
anthropocentric worldview help its inhabitants – its constituents – to act to 
better treat fellow animals and less animate entities in our shared life-world? 
 The issue of what motivates ethical acts (rather than beliefs or feelings) 
is a thorny issue in mainstream ethics, and I cannot attempt to even outline all 
the pertinent arguments here. The concept of altruism is often key, though – 
especially the relationship between altruistic feelings, and altruistic acts. This 
is especially pertinent when considering the place of OTHAs in philosophy and 
culture, since it’s frequently in and via studies of altruism that science – 
sociobiology, especially – relies upon and reiterates (but also exhibits great 
anxiety around) the human/animal dichotomy, as per Chapter 2.  
 Here, my approach to the question of altruistic acts and what motivates 
them effectively disregards sociobiological notions. Instead of entertaining the 
idea that altruistic acts can be identified and broken down into identifiable and 
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measurable ‘biological’ and  ‘psychological’ parts (depending on species), I 
consider how non-anthropocentric – or, at least, less anthropocentric – ethical 
acts might be motivated. I also embrace Calarco’s position that altruistic acts – 
being-for-the-other – among humans and OTHAs ‘are not traces of 
transcendence [as per Levinas, for example] but are acts that are purely and 
wholly immanent to the material world’,242 and happen frequently amongst 
and between all kinds of animals. 
  
II(a). Kinship and Altruism 
Some ethical theories and practices are based upon notions of kinship – 
especially in ‘eastern’ thought, where for key figures such as Zhang Zai, it is 
central. It might therefore be anticipated that if Merleau-Ponty’s radical notion 
of inter-animal kinship is embraced, such theories could morph accordingly, 
providing a basis for motivating non-anthropocentric ethical behaviour. 
However, as evident in for instance JeeLoo Liu’s arguments, basing ethical 
theories on a notion of kinship does not – perhaps cannot – in itself do much to 
motivate ethical, altruistic acts.  
 After discussing Nagel on altruism,243 Liu concludes that ‘[t]he causal 
efficacy of reason as motivation is highly questionable’,244 reflecting the views 
of Damasio, and feminist and postmodern critiques of reason. She then shifts 
the discussion away from the ‘west’ by setting out Zhang Zai’s approach, in 
which morality  
 
consists in transforming one’s biological existence into a moral existence, 
and in elevating one’s physical desires into a form of altruistic desire – 
desire for the well-being of others. This elevated moral state is called 
‘humaneness (ren 仁))’, which is roughly tantamount, though not 
restricted, to the virtue of altruism...245 
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Of crucial importance for Zhang’s approach is that for it to succeed, each 
individual has to adopt a belief in universal kinship246 – available via ‘reflection 
on the common origin of humankind’, hence restricted to humans. But Liu finds 
Zhang’s theory lacking because of its failure to actually motivate people holding 
this belief to act altruistically, hence its anthropocentrism is moot here. 
Concluding that ‘Both Nagel’s and Zhang Zai’s theories fail in aspects of 
causal efficacy, causal persistency and in particular, accessibility’,247 Liu turns 
to Wang Fuzhi, whose moral theory ‘incorporates both moral reason and moral 
sentiments’, and holds that altruism is possible via ‘the combination of both 
moral sentiments and natural emotions, with the further requirement of 
reflection (si 思)’.248  
For Wang, emotions are neither moral nor immoral, but are ‘biologically 
based’ responses to being-in-the-world, ‘generally shared by humans and other 
animals’.249 Insofar as this theory is based in the ‘biological being’ of all 
animals, it’s interesting to compare with Merleau-Pontyan ideas;250 (likening it 
to sociobiology is less convincing, as Wang’s concept of biological beings is not 
reductivist). Nonetheless, Wang’s theory relies on extending self-concern to 
others, and requiring moral agents to ‘imagine others as being similar to 
himself’.251 As such, it is, effectively, a theory based on identity. Also 
problematic is the reliance on ‘reflection’; something that Merleau-Ponty 
rejects as ontologically basic, in part because it’s not shared by all animals. 
Liu’s next move, though, is of real interest to this discussion. Referencing 
Gilles Deleuze, she notes that  
 
What has been the major mental block to altruism is that we conceive 
society merely as a collection of self-interested individuals in competition 
to maximize their own interests, and that the public good is always in 
conflict with immediate private goods. To remove this mental block, we 
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need to abandon this conception of society and consider society as a 
positively integrated totality instead.252 
 
This rejection of sociobiological and the philosophical-ideological norms 
exemplified in a neo-Darwinist and consumer capitalist characterization of 
individuals as competitive is interesting,253 and enables Liu to develop her 
ideas about motivating altruism, and to consider the key question of ‘how 
people can move from feeling sympathetic to taking the action to lend a helping 
hand’.254 Arguing that ‘empathetic imagination carries more motivational force 
for altruism than mere sympathy does’, Liu concludes that  
 
The empathetic imagination derived from Wang Fuzhi’s theory is not 
combined with the impersonal standpoint as in Nagel’s theory. Rather, this 
empathetic imagination is built on one’s relatedness to one’s family 
members and the passion of family love,  
 
as per Deleuze. Hence, ‘[t]he next step is to extend (tui 推) one’s feelings for 
one’s own family to cultivate one’s concern for strangers’.255 Such an unlimited 
approach to who and what might be felt for as one’s family – one’s kin – is 
arguably what Birch as well as Cheney and Weston propose (although they 
don’t refer to ‘kinship’); it also resonates with Merleau-Ponty’s all-
encompassing element of flesh.   
 Liu concludes by developing her central argument that ‘[w]hat is needed 
for a proper social influence that enhances altruism then, is a social practice 
that treats altruism as a norm’.256 There are notable parallels here to Josephine 
Donovan’s care ethics (see below), and to Cheney and Weston’s position that 
what’s needed to develop and motivate non-anthropocentric ethical behaviour 
is an attention to our comportment, the development of a behavioural 
etiquette. Each approach has commonalities vis-à-vis pointing up the 
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importance of bodily, perceptual, and socio-cultural awareness and education 
to ethical behaviour. 
 One clear problem with Liu’s approach is that the concept of kinship at 
its core remains familial: if this understanding is exploded utterly, as in 
Merleau-Ponty’s ontology, then the notion of ‘extending’ to non-kin evaporates, 
since all beings are kin. To reach this point might seem at best improbable, if 
not actually impossible, given the power and specificity of long-held notions of 
human kinship – and, indeed, their shoring up in and of human/animal and 
animal/environment dichotomies. Yet as Oliver asks, ‘what does it mean to 
insist that kinship between humans and animals is unthinkable? Is it any more 
unthinkable than the reality of failure that haunts our ideals of human 
kinship?’ – and, as she then suggests: 
  
Once we recognize that kinship is an impossible ideal, and a violent bloody 
ideal at that, we may be open to the possibility of ‘strange kinship’ based 
not on blood or on generation but on a shared embodiment and the 
gestures of love and friendship among living creatures made possible by 
bodies coexisting in a world on which we all depend.257 
 
Despite, then, that a changed ontology alone may have no direct consequences 
for ethics, I’d agree with Oliver that there is real potential in motivating ethical 
behaviour in an ontology which bases kinship on shared embodiment – on 
flesh, more elementally – and is therefore universal rather than extensionist. 
Again, while this ontological shift may currently seem almost 
incomprehensible – from the perspective of a dominant ontology that demands 
an extentionist approach to the ethical treatment of OTHAs and less animate 
entities – the very fact that the idea is currently being taken seriously by 
philosophers, indicates it might play a part in non-anthropocentric future 
ethics. Additionally, if one combines a Merleau-Pontyan notion of ontological 
kinship with the Levinasian idea of ‘the Other’ calling us to ethical action, this 
may in fact open up the possibility of an ontology of flesh directing humans 
towards non-anthropocentric ethics. 
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II(b). The Face 
While Levinas’s articulation of ‘the face’ is anthropocentric,258 the concept and 
its role in ethical motivation arguably is not. Davy’s deconstructionist re-
reading of it, for instance, argues for the concept’s value to what she terms ‘an 
ethics beyond the interhuman’.259 Her reading suggests, to me, a way to 
combine the immediacy of the ontological experience of ‘the flesh’ Merleau-
Ponty discovers with the primacy of ethical experience of ‘the Other’ Levinas 
describes as coming before categories – that is, before knowledge. 
  Levinas’s ‘face’ is Merleau-Pontyan in its embodiment,260 and in its 
immediacy; for Levinas, ‘the “nakedness of the face” constitutes “the meaning 
prior to ‘things said’”’261 – which echoes Merleau-Ponty’s notion of movement 
being akin to language amongst and between all embodied beings. The 
importance of the face to ethics is that it is via face-to-face relations that ethical 
relations exist, and it is in our seeing the Other’s ‘face’ that we are ‘called’ to 
ethics. On Davy’s reading,  
 
What is crucial in ethical relations is that the Other expresses infinity, that 
the Other teaches, and that the Other can provoke oneself to ethics, not that 
the call to ethics be given through the speech of a human face.  
 
Therefore, Davy argues,  
 
[n]ot only human others can provoke ethical obligations in oneself, but also 
other than human persons such as other animals, plants, rocks, and other 
entities.262  
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Especially given that ‘Levinas instructs that the Other obligates oneself before 
being thematized, and maintains that the capacities of the Other are irrelevant 
to my obligation to give the Other ethical consideration’,263 her reading seems 
tenable. Hence, Davy develops from Levinas’s anthropocentric ethics, a clearly 
non-anthropocentric notion that not only evokes ethical feeling but also action 
in human beings in relation to other-than-human entities as well as other 
humans.  
 To accept Davy’s conclusions that face-to-face relations inspire ethical 
action, however, one must accept precisely this Levinasian premise – that in 
immediate, face-to-face relations, ethics is always already demanded.264 In 
arguing for this – for the motivational power inherent in relations-with-others 
– Casey’s discussion of what he terms ‘the glance’ is an interesting neo-
Levinasian development. 
 Arguing that the ‘face’ must be ‘dehumanized’ to be useful the field of 
eco-phenomenology,265 Casey’s focus is not on OTHAs’ faces, but on ‘the 
equivalent of the face in the environing world’. He presents his own compelling 
example of a clear-cut mountainside in Montana compelling his attention and 
calling him to action.266 He then argues that something important is elided by 
Levinas; that is, ‘the first moment of noticing’ – Casey’s ‘glance’.267 His central 
argument is that ‘the human [sic] glance … is indispensable for consequential 
ethical action’ because, in brief, it ‘gives witness to the other’ and welcome the 
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other into the ethical field of interrelationships.268 Casey then elaborates on 
how aspects of environment – especially surfaces, which he says ‘show 
themselves to be eminently capable of expressivity’269 – might call us to ethical 
action. Arguing that while a glance ‘suffices not just to see distress and 
disorder’ but also to pick ‘up the imperative to do something’ about it, he adds 
that to take the step from being noticeable to being compelling, ‘a certain 
intensity’ in and of the (sur)faces that we notice is required.270 
Ironically, Casey’s exclusion of OTHAs is problematic. It is evident not 
just in his references to ‘the human glance’, but in his ecocentric focus on less 
animate entities to the exclusion of OTHAs, and in his focus on the visual as 
definitive of ‘the glance’. However, if we de-anthropocentrize his idea – 
allowing for fellow beings with different ways of predominantly sensing the 
life-world – I believe it potentially retains its usefulness in pinpointing an 
element of what, in encountering others, motivates us to act ethically.  
The glance might, perhaps, be de-anthropocentrized by appealing to 
Merleau-Pontyan (and Damasian) ideas that conflate visible-tangible-audible: 
recognizing that while for humans, ‘the glance’ is what makes sense as a 
description of the first moment of ethical responsiveness in face-to-face 
relations, for different animals, another term might be more appropriate – for 
dogs, ‘the sniff’; for cats, ‘the first sound’; for dolphins, ‘the first echo’? I do not 
propose this facetiously! There are problems with Casey’s choice of a visual 
term that is epistemologically-loaded; however, there is promise in his idea if it 
is read metaphorically – or simply left as ‘the first moment of noticing’ – and 
elaborated beyond the anthropocentrism of privileging vision. 
 
 
*** 
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Casey worries that ‘[e]nvironmentally uncaring people look away even before 
they glance; or if they look, they see little if anything of the suffering in the 
scarified face of the natural world’.271 This raises further issues around 
motivating human beings to ethical action vis-à-vis OTHAs and environment; 
how to open their senses, as it were, to experience the suffering of those 
‘others’.  
 
II(c). Loving Nature  
Frustrated by environmental ethics’ failure to sufficiently motivate 
conservation behaviours, Carol Booth asserts the need for ‘a motivational turn’, 
and in particular ‘an adequate philosophy of psychology for moral 
philosophy’.272 Her concerns are similar to mine: she worries that while most 
people agree conservation is morally important, ‘burgeoning lists of threatened 
species and ongoing habitat destruction show that these so-called values are 
failing to motivate sufficient political and social pressure for conservation 
reform’.273  
However, Booth looks to ‘the best scientific information about 
motivation’274 for answers, never sufficiently addressing why such information 
is sorely lacking. (She assumes the lack is primarily empirical.) Despite 
proposing the framework for a theory of motivation, she comes up against the 
issues and complexities faced by scientists trying to categorize and fully 
explain ‘altruism’: ultimately, there is insufficient ‘scientific information’ to 
reliably provide the rigour and certitude she claims ‘philosophy’ needs. 
A central problem with Booth’s approach, is that while asserting we lack 
‘a mature theory of motivation because we lack key scientific insights, 
particularly about the neurobiology of the mind’,275 she fails to see that 
‘scientific’ insights might (i) not be available, and (ii) not be the answer to 
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ethical questions (especially if ethics comes before knowledge). Further, she 
fails anyway to acknowledge the work of Damasio (a scientist!) and others that 
suggests quite clearly that emotions are, fundamentally, what motivate living, 
embodied beings.276 This is something that care ethicists have long recognized 
(see below), and something that Milton takes up, from a phenomenological 
perspective.  
 In studying how, and why some humans love and actively protect nature, 
Milton concludes that ‘without emotion there is no commitment, no 
motivation, no action’.277 In reaching this conclusion, she engages with a 
variety of complex issues and examples impossible to adequately summarize 
here. Ultimately, though, she (like Liu) finds that reasoning does not provoke 
environment- and OTHA-friendly action: knowledge absolutely plays a role (for 
instance in providing bases for emotional responses, and in enabling 
practically helpful responses to be implemented), but only perceptions and 
experiences that induce emotions, and generate feelings, actually motivate the 
ethical aspects of action.278 
 Milton argues that this is a problem in the contemporary western 
context, wherein emotions and feelings are radically undervalued, and reason – 
epitomized by objective, scientific reasoning – reigns. In brief, the problem is 
that if emotions and feelings are necessary to motivate ethical action, but 
reason and science are what are being called upon to motivate us, it’s 
unsurprising that insufficient people are acting ethically towards ‘the 
environment’ and OTHAs (not to mention each other!). 
 Milton’s work speaks to the difficult question of whether noticing the 
face of the Other – and seeing distress – actually causes us to act (to alleviate 
the distress). Both she and Damasio point to the intricate interrelations of what 
we term ‘emotion’ and ‘feelings’ and ‘knowledge’ or ‘reason’,279 as well as to the 
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essential role of emotion in decision-making and motivation.280 As Casey notes 
of his experience in Montana, it was his friend who responded to the call for 
action from the clear-cut mountainside – primarily because he, not Casey, had 
the knowledge required to do something effective about the situation. But 
while knowledge of what to do – how to helpfully respond to the Other’s 
distress – is important, it’s not the whole story: we first have to be able to see 
(or otherwise perceive) the distress as distress. Ethics is a question of desire 
(which is Levinas’s contention). If we sense the life-world without the desire to 
be ethically open to others as having a face, it seems unlikely we’ll even be alert 
to (or ‘know’), let alone care about, the distress of others. To do this, we need 
to see OTHAs and environment, as well as fellow human beings, as having 
‘faces’. (This is, of course, where Leopold, Rolston, and Eaton fail, ethically 
speaking: they are too caught up in their knowledge about ecology to see the 
individual faces of the OTHAs about which they write.) 
 In considering why some people personify ‘nature’ and the environment, 
while others do not (thinking of it instead as an impersonal system governed 
by laws, and in terms of resources), Milton makes a crucially important point. 
She claims that capitalism has played a central role in promoting impersonal 
rather than personal understandings of ‘nature’, and in sidelining emotion in 
favour of reason – because, essentially, emotion is no use to market 
interests.281 She also notes how well served capitalism has been by a science 
that depersonalizes ‘nature’, since in so doing, the sense of moral responsibility 
towards nature – as ‘personal’ – is obliterated.282 Noske similarly points up the 
role of capitalism and its self-serving relationship with a science that 
depersonalizes OTHAs: one example she provides has also to do with 
‘motivation’, when she notes the ‘costs and benefits’ analysis of biologists who 
propose the concept of reciprocal altruism – a concept that ‘embodies a liberal 
ideology which emphasizes free market exchange of goods and services and 
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passes off possessive individualism as a “law of nature”’.283 These points reveal 
the extent to which free market capitalism is implicated in the currently deeply 
anthropocentric worldview: something evident, too, in how other-than-
humans are so often talked about via instrumental(izing) language284 – for 
instance as ‘resources’, as an ‘investment’, as having ‘value’. 
 
III. Care Ethics 
Given Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on movement and behaviour as interrogative; 
Damasio’s emphasis on an embodied self as being motivated by emotion rather 
than by reason (insofar as he sees them as separable); and Milton’s discoveries 
about what motivates ‘nature protectionists’, the role of emotion must be 
acknowledged as central in and to motivating ethical behaviour. Feminist 
ethicists of care do precisely this, aiming explicitly ‘to restore … emotional 
responses to the philosophical debate and to validate them as authentic modes 
of knowledge’.285 Arguably, so do a number of ‘eastern’ philosophies, including 
those focused on the concept of ren.286  
 If this is the case, then OTHA behaviour can of course be ethical, too, 
since the evidence that OTHAs have emotions is overwhelming.287  
 Animal care ethics, though, is concerned with how humans treat 
OTHAs.288 While feminist animal care theory has been around for over twenty 
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years now,289 I focus here on Donovan’s 2006 article, in which she emphasizes 
care theory’s dialogical nature, clarifying that, in contrast to how it’s 
sometimes interpreted,  
 
It is not so much … a matter of caring for animals as mothers (human and 
nonhuman) care for their infants as it is one of listening to animals, 
paying emotional attention, taking seriously – caring about – what they 
are telling us.290 
 
Here, the parallels with a position such as Cheney and Weston’s, with an 
emphasis on comportment, is evident. Equally, Donovan emphasizes not just 
the importance but the possibility of communicating with OTHAs. It seems she 
has a Merleau-Pontyan view of how we can understand OTHAs, since she 
argues that ‘We need … to reorient or reemphasize that care theory means 
listening to other life-forms regardless of how alien they may seem to us and 
incorporating their communications into our moral reaction to them’, and that 
we ‘can read other creatures’ language on the principle of homology, for their 
nonverbal language is very much like ours’.291 Offering examples including 
reading the body language of a deer being pursued by a hunter and a dog who’s 
been cut, Donovan states that – effectively on the basis of egomorphism – ‘The 
question, therefore, whether humans can understand animals is, in my opinion, 
a moot one’.292 In this way, Donovan rejects the ‘denial of the body in ethical 
decision-making and in the production of knowledge’,293 evoking in the process 
an appeal to the ‘strange kinship’ Merleau-Ponty identifies between all animals 
as a basis on which humans have no excuse to claim not to know what OTHAs’ 
wishes are, at least on a basic level. It’s worth noting, then, that Donovan give 
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little credence to ecocentric holist philosophers – and others – who endorse 
hunting as an ethical form of wildlife ‘management’:  
 
our ethic of how to treat the deer should be based on what we know of 
the deer’s wishes. If one reads and pays attention to the body language of 
the deer who is fleeing from the hunter, taking seriously the 
communication from the deer that she does not want to be killed or 
injured, one would have to conclude that the hunter should lay down his 
gun.294  
 
 The ecofeminist animal care ethic– like the feminist critique of science’s 
anthropocentrism – seems to share much with Merleau-Ponty’s ontology. 
Indeed, given Donovan’s emphasis on the importance of embodied decision-
making,295 and on the importance of comportment to our grasping OTHAs’ 
wishes, Merleau-Ponty’s notions of shared kinship, inter-animality and the 
flesh seem well suited to founding and advancing a care ethic of the kind 
Donovan espouses – as does, centrally, his insistence that embodied movement 
is how all animals participate in ‘a tacit language’ immanent in environment, 
body and others (discussed earlier: more generally, I agree with Kelly A. Burns 
and Carol Bigwood that Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy has enormous potential in 
addressing some of the gaps in feminist theories of embodied selfhood).296 
 Care ethics is not an entirely unitary position, of course, and while 
Donovan’s work was foundational in bringing it into the realm of OTHAs, hers 
is not its only voice. However, Donovan’s work is instructive, suggesting a high 
degree of affinity between a Merleau-Pontyan ontology and feminist animal 
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care ethics, as well as between such ethics and the focus on etiquette and 
comportment I’ve identified as central to non-anthropocentrism. 
  
*** 
In a recent BBC documentary presented by Sir David Attenborough, an 
elephant calf is shown to be desperately thirsty, and his/her297 deterioration is 
filmed; the lack of water ultimately leads to the calf’s death, and the footage 
shows the mother’s distress at her child’s evident suffering. Referring to the 
sequence, which drew complaints from viewers, Attenborough is reported as 
saying: ‘Of course you see really tough things, but there’s nothing you can do 
about them’ (my emphasis). He added: 
 
If I saw a little baby gazelle and a cheetah coming along about to pounce 
on it, if I nipped out of the Landrover and said boo to the cheetah…  
 
Well … it might say something quite rude to me back, but apart from that 
you would have a frightened baby gazelle, and a cheetah which would 
perhaps go away and have to attack another baby gazelle. 
 
The little baby gazelle would be so traumatised it would be lost, so you 
actually make things far worse by interfering than not.  
 
If you’re a film cameraman you are trained as it were to be the observer, a 
non-participant. That’s very important.298 
 
  
 I’d argue that Attenborough’s attempt to explain (away) the failure to act 
(to prevent the calf from dying of thirst) in this case by way of his hypothetical 
example concerning a cheetah attacking a baby gazelle, reveals just how 
tenuous his ethical position is. The story he offers is an extremely poor 
parallel: it sets out a situation quite unlike that in which the baby elephant 
found itself. First, there was no predator threatening the elephant; no cheetah 
was present (only several humans willing to effectively ignore its suffering on 
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the basis of their status as ‘non-participant observers’); second, unlike in the 
hypothetical situation, taking action to prevent a death, i.e., providing water for 
the elephant, would not have put in danger the humans on scene, nor would 
their actions have ‘deprived’ a predator of its potential kill; third, it is not 
remotely likely that the baby elephant would have ended up ‘traumatized’ and 
‘lost’ in the face of being given water by a human being, to save it from death. 
Arguably, it was significantly more traumatic to be aware of humans watching 
it, whilst it suffered horribly. 
 In such circumstances, I’d argue that Attenborough’s arguments – those 
of the scientific ‘objectivity’ involved in being non-participant observers – quite 
evidently hold very little moral weight. Equally, arguments from an overtly 
capitalist perspective – e.g., that the calf was more ‘valuable’ in the market (of 
nature programming) dead than alive; or that the human-calf relationship has 
no market value, hence is meaningless – are unethical. In contrast, arguments 
that the calf’s ‘face’ – the suffering clearly evident in its movements and 
sounds, experienced via egomorphism – called, or should have called, fellow 
living beings to ethical action (not just to feel sympathy or empathy) seem 
ethically stronger, irrespective of the specific embodiment (as an elephant) of 
the being concerned.299 Certainly, it seems clear that the viewers who 
complained place ethics before knowledge, in the sense that Cheney and 
Weston propose – experiencing the elephant calf as a fellow embodied being 
who was suffering, and whom another embodied being could have helped.  
 Any arguments that any human being should not take action in this sort 
of case – on what amount to epistemological grounds privileging ‘observation’ 
over ethics – are simply not compelling. Nor would they even be an option if 
the baby in question had been human, thereby revealing the crux of the 
problem: anthropocentrism.  
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 As it happens, in this case the calf’s situation was part of a larger 
problem, where long-term drought was causing numerous OTHA deaths. The 
documentary’s producer explains this, holding that he was therefore 
‘powerless’ to help.300 This begs the question of whether the same attitude – 
the same lack of action – would apply were thousands of humans dying from 
drought.301 Nor does it erase the fact that Attenborough provides an 
explanation that evokes their status as non-participant observers, and uses an 
unrelated hypothetical example to justify the (in)action.302 Further, 
underscoring the disregard for individual OTHAs this kind of anthropocentrism 
reveals (displaying instead an interest in species),303 the producer says there’s 
‘a happy ending’ because when the rains came, ‘the mum had another chance 
to have babies’ and ‘more than 200 baby elephants were born – a record’.304 
  This example reveals a great deal about the issues and concerns of this 
dissertation – as well as about the enormous complexity of situations in which 
individual embodied suffering takes place.  
 It indicates that humans can and do feel not just empathy for OTHAs, but 
that many of us feel this as a call to (ethical) action, and object strongly to 
humans who resist (or don’t experience) such a call. It also suggests that in 
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lived experience, ethical feelings are prior to epistemology: Attenborough’s 
comments305 indicate that it was emotionally ‘tough’ to watch the calf die, and 
that it was, therefore, only the commitment to a scientific ideal of being a ‘non-
participant observer’ that prevented him from acting when he felt he ought. 
Arguably, an ontology – a worldview – based on the notion of shared flesh with 
all embodied others, as well as with environment, would have made his 
position unthinkable – and the elephant might not have died. 
 
*** 
The above example also suggests the potential ethical power of an ontology 
quite different from that which currently dominates human consciousness. 
Departing from the view expressed by Toadvine, I concur with Brook and with 
Molly Hadley Jenson, amongst others: a Merleau-Pontyan ‘view of the self as 
elementally open and reciprocally involved with others is an ethically potent 
interpretation’, and ‘[a]n ethics informed by Merleau-Ponty’s flesh summons us 
to seek a course of action that promotes exchanges and relations among a 
diversity of beings within the ecological community and preserves rich 
possibilities of ecological relations in the future’.306 
 In this context, notions such as egomorphism, the ‘call’ to ethical action 
evoked in and by the ‘face’, and the recognition of the importance of emotion 
and feelings to (ethical) motivation arguably work with (and to promote) 
ontology as discovered by Merleau-Ponty and his readers. In the current 
philosophical climate – in the west, and more widely – an analysis and more 
widespread acceptance of such notions can only help shift worldviews towards 
a less anthropocentric ontology, and towards less anthropocentric ethics. As 
Davy suggests, this is desirable because  
 
If ethics do not come before epistemology, before thematization, they may 
not arise at all, leaving us stuck in an anthropocentric view of the world.307 
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 Yet still even those who commit their lives to OTHAs and environment – 
including iconic figures such as Attenborough – resist the ‘call’ of an elephant 
calf, choosing to remain ‘stuck in an anthropocentric view of the world’ in 
which it is considered more ethical to maintain an ‘objective’ position as an 
‘observer’ than to provide water for a dying OTHA. This alone, I’d argue, 
evidences not just the need to promote the primacy of ethics, but the damage 
done in the name of an epistemology that actively resists it. It’s to the question 
of epistemology’s privilege that I now turn. 
 
IV. Ethics, ‘Philosophy’, Epistemophilia 
A significant link between western philosophy and western science is – 
reflecting the roots of the word ‘philosophy’ – a love and privileging of 
knowledge. Indeed, not only does philosophy mean ‘the love of knowledge, or 
wisdom’, but the Latin roots of the word science mean ‘knowledge’ or 
‘wisdom’. It is therefore unsurprising that philosophy ‘loves’ science! 
 The prioritizing of knowledge over ethics has been and remains of 
particular concern to many; it’s of course what Levinas questions in asserting 
ethics as an alternative first philosophy,308 and is largely what motivates 
feminist care ethics. Here, I focus specifically on the problem of epistemophilia.  
 Proposing that ‘philosophy’ can be interpreted not just as ‘the love of 
wisdom’ but as ‘the wisdom of love’, Irigaray writes: 
 
This possible interpretation would imply that philosophy joins together, 
more than it has done in the West, the body, the heart, and the mind. That 
it not be founded on contempt for nature. That it not resort to a logic that 
formalizes the real by removing it from concrete experience; that it be less 
a normative science of the truth than the search for measures that help in 
living better: with oneself, with others, with the world…309 
 
This hope for philosophy is implied in care ethics as well as ethics of 
comportment, and is evident too in a range of non-western thought.  
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Min Ou Yang resists the very notion of ‘philosophy’ as being applicable 
to Chinese thought. He points out that ‘[t]he attitude of loving and therefore 
enjoying the wonder of wisdom’ – epistemophilia – is a decidedly western 
phenomenon: ‘[i]n Chinese culture, loving or enjoying wisdom … [was] 
mentioned by Confucius, but it has never been a celebrated tradition or an end 
of intellectual activities’.310 His central point is that just because (western) 
‘philosophy purports to study or search for something that is supposed to be 
universal does not make the philosophical practice itself universal’. He 
therefore proposes the term ‘sinosophy’ instead of ‘Chinese philosophy’,311 
substituting ‘sino (Chinese)’ for the attitude of ‘philo (love)’. Whilst this doesn’t 
eradicate ‘sophia (knowledge/wisdom)’ from the equation, it does share 
Irigaray’s emphatic foregrounding of ‘rational’ western philosophy’s basis in 
the love (an emotion!) of wisdom/knowledge. By reminding us that other 
cultures don’t share this love – this reification – of epistemology, it provides a 
clear sense of the historical and cultural specificity of philosophy in the west. 
It’s then interesting to consider how Ou Yang summarizes the different 
purposes he argues inform philosophy and sinosophy:  
 
the former roughly prioritizes all sorts of human knowledge and enjoys 
the wonder with it, while the main concern of the latter is human life itself, 
and how to achieve peacefulness, harmony and stability of body and mind. 
 
Here, sinosophy seems to have much in common with philosophers of 
nonanthropocentrism: it, like them, desires not ‘knowledge’, but to live life 
peacefully and harmoniously. 
Sinosophy’s exclusion of OTHAs implicit in the reference to ‘human life’ 
is problematic, as is the apparent mind/body dualism. So while I agree with 
Merleau-Ponty that ‘western philosophy can learn from Indian and Chinese 
thought “to rediscover our relationship to Being”’,312 it’s clearly not that Indian 
and Chinese thought simply overcome philosophy’s limitations in respect of 
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anthropocentrism, androcentrism and their founding dichotomies (if only they 
did!).313 Nonetheless, they can teach the west something in terms of priorities: 
they evidence the partiality of ‘philosophy’, and simultaneously that there exist 
thought systems in the world that resist privileging knowledge, thereby 
providing ways to imagine ethics – or ways to live – differently; to focus on 
knowing love rather than on loving knowledge.   
 This dissertation is concerned primarily with philosophy, but is written 
as part of an interdisciplinary degree that brings together ‘philosophy’ and 
‘anthrozoology’. As such, concerns about the inadequacies of ‘philosophy’ are 
perhaps especially pertinent. Both Irigaray and Ou Yang suggest that 
‘philosophy’ is inadequate to attend to the ethical, and to the complexity of 
lived experience and relationships. 
Irigaray’s concern in particular is that the narrow conception of ‘self’ 
arising from privileging and conversing with only those who are similar to 
one’s self is precisely unwise, arising from ‘a fear or an incapacity to enter into 
relation with the other’ … unthinkingly ‘constrain[ing] him to remain among 
those like himself without confronting the delicate relational, but also logical, 
problems that a dialogue with one or several different subjects poses, or would 
pose’.314 She accuses philosophers of having done precisely this. Embracing an 
ontology of flesh and the notion of intersubjectality offers a way to counter 
this, to engage with others of all sorts, and thereby to confront the problems 
involved in encountering multiple and multifarious ‘others’. It also recognizes 
difference, as Irigaray insists we must – but includes non-human others in its 
conception of those who embody differences, which Irigaray does not. What 
Irigaray adds, though, to Merleau-Ponty’s ontology, is the point that as well as 
sharing one flesh, we share the same air – that ‘[a]ir is that in which we dwell 
and which dwells in us … providing for passages … between us’.315 In evoking 
                                                 
313
 For a relevant example of both what sinosophy might offer western thought but also the problems – 
including androcentrism in sinosophy as in philosophy – see the discussion about western care ethics and 
the concept of ‘ren’, or ‘jen’ (‘仁’): the sources are listed above at footnote 286. 
314
 Irigaray, The way of love, p.5. 
315
 ibid., p.67. 
 81 
air as ‘what is left in common between subjects living in different worlds’,316 
Irigaray offers another way towards love – towards recognizing that rather 
than our being isolated, the space between us, between all things, is full.  
The trouble with philosophers, says Irigaray, is that they have ‘forgotten 
air and thereby forgotten that [they are] nourished and supported by air’.317 
What Irigaray encourages us to remember is ‘the density of air remaining in 
between’ us and others;318 a density that, as Oliver puts it, is ‘the medium 
through which we perceive the world’.319 Full of vibrations, particles, energy 
and waves, air – like flesh – is full of energy, of vitality, and enables us to 
connect with others.  
Given Merleau-Ponty’s insistence on synaesthesia, on the intertwined 
nature of our senses, then vision too is proximal, as our flesh touches the flesh 
of the world, and so flesh and air work together to ensure that while we are all 
distinct, we are all also always connected to others – not just to other humans, 
but to all other animals, and also to all other non-human entities.  
 
V. Revisiting ‘Ethics’  
In their article inspired by Cheney and Weston’s ideas, Jickling and Paquet 
write in respect of the Yukon wolves their article concerns that ‘we are the 
wolf’s relations as much as she is ours’,320 Latterly, though, they briefly tell the 
same story I did about Leopold and the wolf, and write: ‘shooting that wolf was 
not ennobling and he felt that deeply’.321 What they miss, though, is precisely 
what Kheel critiques: that Leopold doesn’t care about the individual wolf, but is 
motivated by decidedly anthropocentric emotions (a love of hunting, for one) 
and the equally anthropocentric science of ecology and his feelings ‘for’ the 
mountain (which he uses to represent a scientific view of ‘the environment’).  
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 Contra. Jickling and Paquet’s suggestion, I’d argue, Leopold totally 
misses the call to ethics in the wolf’s face: his embodied etiquette, his 
comportment, towards the wolf is far from respectful, as is his refusal to listen 
to her, and to recognize her as an individual. This is because he had an a priori 
idea of her as an object – which is precisely the danger when epistemology (an 
‘ecological’ worldview, in this case) is placed ahead of ethics (which is, 
ironically, the very position Jickling and Paquet argue for so eloquently in their 
article). Leopold’s behaviour – his lack of ‘listening’ to the wolf, in Donovan’s 
terms; of recognizing her as having subjectality and sharing his flesh, in 
Merleau-Pontyan terms – cannot possibly be read as ethical.  
In contrast, Francione’s ethics arguably have some affinities with a 
Merleau-Pontyan approach to OTHAs, if not less animate entities. His 
failure to challenge the anthropocentrism of the key concepts he uses ‘for’ 
OTHAs – especially sentience, rights, and personhood – remains deeply 
problematic, as discussed above. However, he explicitly rejects the ethical 
significance of how much ‘like’ humans individual OTHAs are, holding that 
[t]he only thing … required is that nonhumans be sentient’ – defining 
sentience here as meaning to be ‘perceptually aware’.322 This suggests 
Francione has an essential awareness of all animals as sense-sensing, and 
even as sharing the same flesh. However, his basic conviction that OTHAs 
have ethical ‘faces’ is firmly in conflict with the anthropocentric, human-
defined terms with which he then works to establish their ‘rights’ – placing 
knowledge, as he does, ahead of ethics.  
So while Francione’s identity politics are in many ways a 
world(view) away from those proposed by non-anthropocentric 
philosophies of indistinction, his founding attitude towards OTHAs is less 
distant. That said, Francione’s vehement rejection of a feminist animal 
care ethic’s critique of the dominant concepts of rights and personhood, 
and insistence that ‘animal rights theory is the only way to alter the status 
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of animals as property, or “things”’,323 makes it clear he’s unlikely to 
personally develop his theory along the lines of a different ontology. 
The difference between Francione and Leopold remains, though: 
Francione sees OTHAs as beings-for-themselves, while Leopold sees them 
as resources, as beings-for-humans and ‘the biotic community’ as a whole.  
These are but a couple of broad-brush suggestions as to the possible 
impact of a Merleau-Pontyan ontology on currently mainstream 
approaches to ‘animal ethics’. They would be interesting to consider 
further, as would care ethics, Val Plumwood’s more recent ecofeminist 
virtue ethics,324 and other philosophies I’ve barely touched upon, including 
specifically vegetarian and vegan ethics. 
 
VI. Of Flesh and Air 
While the currently hegemonic, scientific-capitalist worldview is 
anthropocentric and promotes in myriad ways the concept of an isolated, 
individual, thinking human subject against whom all others are objectified and, 
generally, seen as separable from and resources for ‘humanity’, this worldview 
is far from universally accepted, even in the west. Despite its machinations, and 
its enormous sphere of influence, many individuals and groups of humans 
reject it – if to varying extents, and whether consciously or not.  
In this context, surely Merleau-Ponty’s ontology is not so difficult to 
entertain. The notion of shared embodiment and kinship with OTHAs is not so 
strange – unless one accepts the dominant worldview that, shaped by 
masculinism and capitalism, works to hide such realities by promoting 
‘scientific’ knowledge and ridiculing ‘anthropomorphism’. And the idea of 
other, less animate elements of nature being part of that same flesh? This is 
surely not much of a stretch, either: people often express an affinity with trees, 
a one-ness with the sky and the earth, feelings for plants, rivers, oceans… there 
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is nothing so very extraordinary about the experiences and perceptions that 
ground Merleau-Ponty’s ontology: they are precisely everywhere, all around 
us, if we pay attention to our senses.  
The notion of movement, too, might easily be expanded: for Merleau-
Ponty, the focus is on humans and OTHAs, but all life moves (plants grow, 
winds blow, tectonic plates shift), and animals interact with all life – not just 
with each other, but with all flesh. There is a story in which a woman slowly 
turns to stone; towards the end, she sees movement in the hillside – in the 
earth, in the rocks themselves.325 Not (entirely) metaphorical, this reminds us 
that rocks move, the earth lives… it is only our particular, anthropocentric 
perception in and of time that makes this hard to ‘see’.  
And then there is air. As Irigaray articulates, air is not just around us, but 
in us; it connects us, there is not ‘nothing there’ in our life-world (as 
contemporary physics confirms)… like Merleau-Ponty’s element of flesh, the 
element of air is always of us, always between us, always connecting as well as 
sustaining us. And then, as J.M. Howarth proposes, ‘our moods are part of our 
nature, our nature and not our understanding or our rationality, and our 
nature is more like nature than we may often think'.326 How does she arrive at 
this, but via thinking through Merleau-Ponty: considering his position that 
behaviour occurs in different styles – different beings have, precisely, different 
styles of being, of behaviour, on his account – then, says Howarth,  
 
If we are to find resemblances between us and nature, the obvious place 
to look would be behaviour, movement, since that is something we share 
with nature: nature moves. Nature can “echo” our moods because it 
moves in detectably similar, if mysterious, ways.327 
 
 And so, ultimately, not only is the ontology revealed by Merleau-Ponty 
and those following him full of promise in overcoming epistemophilia as 
embodied in anthropocentrism, androcentrism, and the rest, but achieving 
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such a worldview is not impossible, is not merely theoretical – as are, for 
example, the many rigidly worked-through ‘systems’ of ethics that have been 
proposed and still vie for position in western philosophy (and beyond). It 
seems to me that human people’s current behaviours – especially those which 
challenge the hegemony of mainstream science, of anthropocentrism, of 
androcentrism – already imply an awareness of an alternative way of 
experiencing and responding to reality (and shaping the constructs humans 
inevitably create), and a desire to implement change. There is also plenty to 
support, and little to refute, that OTHAs are our kin, in that they share 
embodiment and what motivates us humans – that is, emotions. To suggest 
otherwise, to argue against egomorphism, is little more than an unfounded 
reiteration of Cartesianism at its worst, at its most disembodied and 
solipsistic… it is to (inexplicably, except Irigaray perhaps explains it) cut 
oneself off from experience, from others, and from not just flesh but air. And to 
think that we can exist with knowledge, but without flesh, without air? That is 
epistemophilia – that is, philosophy – gone dangerously awry.  
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Conclusions: 
ELEMENTAL COMPORTMENT:  
AN ETIQUETTE OF ONE FLESH? 
 
Our ethical responsibility comes not from our sovereignty or our 
autonomy but from our interdependence on the earth and its creatures. 
(Kelly Oliver, 2009)328 
 
 
The philosophies I’ve focused on resist reifying the love of knowledge, 
promoting instead an ethics that is primary, prior to epistemology, and based 
on an ontology of kinship between all animals and a life-world that shares one 
‘flesh’. They thereby provide insights and strategies especially potent in 
rethinking notions of selfhood and environment beyond anthropocentrism. By 
discussing some of those ideas, I hope to have identified ways via which a non-
anthropocentric ontology and ethics might be discovered, pursued, and shared. 
 Anthropocentrism and its founding dichotomies must, ethically, be 
rejected. They lead not just to Leopold’s depersonalizing utterly the murder of 
an individual wolf, to Rolston’s responding similarly to the death of an 
individual elk, but to the promulgation of a worldview that sees all OTHAs as 
lacking selfhood; to an expanse of similarly anthropocentric attitudes and 
‘reasons’ to kill, maim, and ‘manage’ innumerable OTHAs and less animate 
entities; to treat all non-human others as resources; even to Attenborough’s 
letting an elephant calf die when he could have provided it with the water it 
needed to survive.  
 A non-anthropocentric ethic will not rise automatically from the 
ontology Merleau-Ponty’s remarkable work reveals and opens up to us. I have 
argued that it can, perhaps at best, provide us with a worldview far more likely 
to promote and enable us to live in less anthropocentric ways. Any non-
anthropocentric ethics it gives rise to would be akin to the holist ecofeminist 
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philosophy Kheel envisages329 – that is, less a defined ethic, and more an ethos, 
or ‘way of life’. 
 To achieve this way of life, we must, ethically, resist – and, crucially, 
build alternatives to – an ontology and forms of knowledge that encourage us 
to do nothing when a fellow being is suffering, when we sense in its face a call 
to ethical action. We should not just do everything we can to help that being, 
but to ensure that we inhabit a world where it’s incomprehensible – an 
unthinkable breach of embodied etiquette – to do otherwise. 
 We need a new worldview based on a Merleau-Pontyan expression of 
ontology. An ethics informed by such an ontology, of flesh, cannot be 
abstracted from experience and intersubjectal relations, and, as Hadley Jensen 
argues, is eminently well suited to respond to the contemporary environmental 
crisis that envelops us all330 – humans, OTHAs, and less animate entities. 
 Whether or not we will become better able to communicate with OTHAs, 
and thus to participate in a more mutual ethics, I don’t know. But we already 
have the ability to implement a less anthropocentric ethics than we do, 
globally, as the ‘dominant’ species. We are more than capable of perceiving the 
basic desires of many OTHAs and less animate entities, and those alone make 
abundantly clear that we should behave very differently from the way in which 
we currently do towards all non-humans with whom we share one flesh and 
one air... elements that we are slowly but surely destroying.  
 Perhaps most of all we can recognize the reality of inter-animal 
intersubjectality, and the reality of love for non-human as well as human 
others. We must find and found ways to contextualize our love of knowledge 
within this knowledge of love – and to prioritize love. This is not a call for a 
simplistic ‘ethic of care’, promoting universal ‘love’: instead, as Donovan and 
others suggest, it has everything to do with our etiquette – our body-subject 
comportment and our listening and responding to the communications and 
wishes of others of all sorts.  
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